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ASSORTATIVE MATCHING WITH LARGE FIRMS
JAN EECKHOUT
Department of Economics, UPF-ICREA-GSE and University College London
PHILIPP KIRCHER
Department of Economics, University of Edinburgh
Two cornerstones of empirical and policy analysis of firms, in macro, labor and in-
dustrial organization, are the determinants of the firm size distribution and the deter-
minants of sorting between workers and firms. We propose a unifying theory of produc-
tion where management resolves a tradeoff between hiring more versus better workers.
The span of control or size is therefore intimately intertwined with the sorting pattern.
We provide a condition for sorting that captures this tradeoff between the quantity and
quality of workers and that generalizes Becker’s sorting condition. A system of differ-
ential equations determines the equilibrium allocation, the firm size, and wages, and
allows us to characterize the allocation of the quality and quantity of labor to firms of
different productivity. We show that our model nests a large number of widely used
existing models. We also augment the model to incorporate labor market frictions in
the presence of sorting with large firms.
KEYWORDS: Sorting, large firms, span of control, firm size, complementarities, su-
permodularity.
1. INTRODUCTION
TWO CORNERSTONES OF EMPIRICAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS OF FIRMS, IN MACRO, LA-
BOR AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, are the determinants of the firm size distribution
and the determinants of sorting between workers and firms. Firm size reflects an impor-
tant aspect of a firm’s productivity. Firms that own or invent more productive technolo-
gies tend to exploit those advantages by producing and selling more. To that end, they
also hire more workers. At the same time, the skill composition of a firm’s workforce
is crucial for output. Firms’ competition for skilled workers leads to sorting of work-
ers of different skills into jobs of different productivity. The literature has treated these
two determinants—firm size and sorting—largely independently.1 What is missing is a
tractable framework that allows for the standard firm size choice but also allows thought
about sorting heterogeneous workers into such large firms. In this paper, we take a first
step towards proposing such a framework that connects the two and ask what the key
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as special cases in our general framework, as well as the relation of our setup to the broader literature on
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forces are that determine sorting when firm size matters, and what the key forces are that
determine the size distribution when sorting matters.
We introduce a model of the firm where the span of control—the number of workers
under the control of management within that firm—attributes an essential role to the
firm. Just like in the canonical macroeconomic context, firms in our model predominantly
make quantity decisions. Endowed with different management, technologies, or capital,
companies choose the span of control accordingly, which has important implications for
the size of firms (Lucas (1978), Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)). This
labor factor intensity decision is both realistic and a convenient modeling device. Yet,
firms typically face a more complex tradeoff. They simultaneously choose the quality of
the workers as well as the quantity. A retail arm of a company that sells electronics prod-
ucts, for example, faces the tradeoff between hiring skilled shop floor assistants who have
extensive experience with a wide range of its products versus more unskilled assistants
who can only be of help with the most basic features. Heterogeneity in skills and jobs
is without doubt an important component of the labor market. Without the quantity di-
mension, the allocation process of differently skilled workers to jobs has extensively been
analyzed, both with search frictions and without. In the standard frictionless matching
model (Becker (1973)), each firm consists of exactly one job which leads to sorting since
the firm’s choice is in effect about which worker to hire, the extensive margin, rather than
how many, the intensive margin.
By simultaneously solving the quantity and the quality dimension within the same
model, we not only nest other well-known models of sorting and of firm size. Most impor-
tantly, we also analyze how the different technological determinants interact in general
equilibrium with endogenous prices. Within this framework, we pin down the features of
the equilibrium allocation: the sorting pattern, the firm size distribution, and the wage
distribution. We find a surprisingly simple condition for assortative matching that cap-
tures both the quality and quantity considerations. This condition is new and compares
the different degrees of complementarity2 along four margins: (1) type complementarity
captures the interaction between firm and worker types. Clearly, if better firms receive
an exceptionally high return only from better workers, then they will end up hiring those
workers. This is the only effect present in standard quality-sorting models in the spirit of
Becker (1973). Additionally, there is the (2) complementarity in quantities of workers and
resources, just as in standard models with homogeneous labor and resources (or capital).
There is the (3) span of control complementarity between the firm or manager type and the
number of workers that features in Lucas (1978): how much of a higher marginal product
do better managers have from supervising more workers of a given skill? Finally, there is
the (4) managerial resource complementarity, the complementarity between worker skills
and managerial or firm resources: do better workers have a higher marginal product when
receiving more supervision time? A simple tradeoff between these four forces determines
the pattern of sorting, characterizing the efficient equilibrium outcome and measuring
the efficiency losses that would result from misallocation.
We also precisely pin down the composition of the workforce across different firm types,
that is, how firms resolve the tradeoff between span of control over more workers versus
the quality workers. A system of three differential equations governs the equilibrium al-
location of types and quantities. In particular, this gives a prediction for the firm’s span of
2We will use the terms complementarity and supermodularity interchangeably. For our purposes, it can best
be thought of as the fact that the marginal contribution of higher input (quantity or quality) to output is higher
when matched with other high inputs, that is, there are synergies. In mathematical terms, the cross-partial of
the output generated is positive (negative in the case of substitutes or submodularity).
ASSORTATIVE MATCHING WITH LARGE FIRMS 87
control, and therefore, for the firm size distribution, and also determines the equilibrium
allocation of skills and the wage distribution. This system also makes explicit how firm
size interacts with the skill premium, providing a simple mapping between assortative
matching and the size distribution of firms. Our conditions tell us when there is Positive
Assortative Matching (PAM), when worker types are increasing or decreasing in firm size,
and when there is Negative Assortative Matching (NAM), and again, when worker types
are increasing or decreasing in firm size.
The combination of size and quality sorting allows us to study how changes in the size
distribution affect wage inequality and the skill premium. We can also investigate how
changes in the inequality of inputs affects the firm size distribution. Obviously, neither of
these questions can be answered in models where all inputs are homogeneous or where
all firms have equal size, as in most of the previous literature.
The major appeal of our model is that it nests a large number of well-established mod-
els in the literature. Section 4 is devoted to how the relevant literature relates to the
mathematics of our model. We have chosen to give detailed credit to the related litera-
ture only after we introduce our model, allowing us to combine the discussion of related
papers with some simple analytical arguments about how these can be represented within
our framework. Most notably, we show that Becker’s one-to-one matching model is the
limit case of a multiplicatively separable version of ours wherein the quantities enter as
a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) technology that converges to Leontief, that
is, with an elasticity of substitution equal to zero. We show similar connections to influ-
ential papers written by Sattinger (1975) and Garicano (2000) who embedded specific
forms in which firm size depends on worker and firm types but did not allow this to be a
choice variable. We also discuss other related work from various literatures, such as the
misallocation debate.
Theoretically, the main contribution of our results is to solve and characterize a model
of sorting with many-to-one matches. Moreover, our theory is cast in a framework that is
amenable to its application in standard macro, labor, and industrial organization models.
As a testament to its generality, this simple model nests a large number of well-known
models currently used, yet, we obtain the general formulation while retaining assump-
tions that render the model tractable and allow for clear insights on sorting and firm size.
Conceptually, this is novel; we are not aware of anyone having analyzed it. The many-to-
one matching model has long been known in the social choice literature, but has typically
been analyzed exclusively to show existence in a small economy with finite agents (in par-
ticular, Kelso and Crawford (1982) and their celebrated gross-substitutes condition). The
characterization of the solution of our proposed model offers a set of conditions hitherto
unknown. Technically, the derivation of the necessary condition for equilibrium aligns
with existing models. What is much more challenging is the sufficiency of the condition.
In the standard one-to-one matching model, this is easily satisfied. In this many-to-one
matching model with endogenous size, our local sorting condition does not easily inte-
grate to a global condition, which makes the problem substantially more complex.
We also discuss our model in the context of applications to topics of economic rele-
vance, such as mismatch of inputs of production, the skill premium, and economic geog-
raphy. Existing theories currently discuss heterogeneous inputs only in passing and rely
on homogeneity in their formal modeling. We illustrate how heterogeneity can be incor-
porated and illustrate its importance. Building on the mismatch model of Adamopoulos
and Restuccia (2014), we illustrate the role of skill heterogeneity in quantifying the misal-
location of resources. And we show how the seminal framework to study the evolution of
the skill premium of Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull, and Violante (2000) can be extended
to allow for heterogeneity even within the high and the low skill sector.
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Our theory is also amenable to quantitative analysis. In an earlier version of this paper,
we quantitatively assessed the theory to analyze the evolution of technology along two
dimensions: we parameterized the model to capture “traditional” Skill Biased Technolog-
ical Change, as well as Quantity Biased Technological Change that allows firms to adjust
their size. Using matched employer-employee data from Germany, we found that tech-
nological change along the second dimension has been very important over the last two
decades in driving the size distribution. It has also been a mitigating force that limits the
impact of skill-biased technological change on wage inequality. These exercises highlight
the important equilibrium interplay of sorting and firm size.
Finally, we show how our framework lends itself to introducing search frictions. To
our knowledge, this extension with search frictions provides the first model that com-
bines three essential features of labor market data: two-sided heterogeneity with comple-
mentarities, unemployment due to search frictions, and large firms. Existing models have
combined two of those three, but not all three at the same time. Most surprisingly, we find
that in this model, the condition for assortative matching is independent of the matching
technology and thus holds even if we move away from a Walrasian setting.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay out the model. In Section 3,
we first solve the model and derive the general sorting condition, and then we characterize
the equilibrium assignment, the firm size distribution, and the wage profile. We discuss in
Section 4 the special cases that are nested in the model, we review the related literature,
and we present extensions that outline how the model might be used in applied settings. In
Section 5, we analyze search frictions in the context of sorting with large firms. Section 6
concludes.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a static assignment problem in the tradition of Monge–Kantorovich, ex-
cept that the allocation is not limited to one-to-one matching. To preview the basic eco-
nomic situation that the model intends to capture, we consider an economy with two sides,
which we mostly label as firms and workers, even though the labels managers/workers,
farms/land, and capital/labor would be equally appropriate. Heterogeneity exists on both
sides: workers differ by skills, and firms are heterogeneous in terms of the quality of some
proprietary resource that is exclusive to the firm, such as scarce managerial talent or par-
ticular proprietary capital goods. These scarce internal resources limit the scope of the
firm. In a modern business setting, the resource might reflect the time endowment of an
entrepreneur who spends time interacting with and supervising her employees, and qual-
ity can refer to the value of the final output or the ability during such supervision. If she
supervises different workers, she might adjust supervision time to suit each worker’s skill.
Output depends on the type of worker and of the supervisor and the time they interact.
The setup is formalized as follows.
AGENTS. The economy consists of firms and workers. Workers are indexed by their skill
x ∈ X = R+, and Hw(x) denotes the measure of workers with skills below x. Firms are
indexed by their productivity type y ∈Y =R+, where Hf(y) denotes the measure of firms
with type below y . Unless otherwise stated, we focus on distributions Hf and Hw with
nonzero continuous densities hf and hw on the compact subsets [xx] ⊂X and [y y] ⊂Y ,
respectively, but especially for our main characterization result we also provide a proof
for arbitrary distribution functions. In line with the matching literature, we assume that
x and y are observable and focus our interest on the equilibrium allocation problem in
the presence of complete information. The incomplete information problem remains of
interest and importance, but it is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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PREFERENCES AND PRODUCTION. A firm of type y that hires l workers of identical type
x produces output according to nonnegative function f (x y l), which is strictly increasing
and strictly concave in l. This nests heterogeneous y firms that make intensive margin
choices about firm size l familiar from Lucas (1978), Jovanovic (1982), and Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993), and heterogeneous y firms that make extensive margin choices
about worker type x familiar from Becker (1973), enabling us to study their interaction.
For the casual reader, without substantial loss of insight, this can serve as a primitive for
the subsequent analysis. Nevertheless, we proceed by providing a more micro-founded
production structure that in principle allows for multiple worker types within the same
firm. This allows us to closely link our study to existing work on worker supervision, to
highlight the underlying assumptions that give rise to a uniform workforce in equilibrium,
and to eventually represent our results in an even more concise way.
The main primitive of our model is the output function F : R4+→R++ that describes
how the firm combines labor and its resources to produce output. To impose discipline on
the problem and as is standard in the literature, we assume the technology is common to
all firms. What differs are the inputs. We can thus interpret the firm productivity (or TFP)
as y . Output is perfectly transferable, and firms maximize profits while workers maximize
wage income. A firm has a fixed amount of proprietary resources. If a firm of type y hires
an amount of labor l of type x, it must choose a fraction of its resources r that it dedicates
to this worker type. This allows the firm y to produce output
F(x y l r) (1)
with this worker type x, where the first two arguments (x y) are quality variables describ-
ing the worker and firm types, while the latter two arguments (l r) are quantity variables
describing the level of inputs. We assume that output is twice differentiable, but place
no further restrictions on the quantity variables, even though we often refer to higher
types as “better” types, which is more appropriate for output functions that are increasing
in types. Our main assumptions on the production functions concern the quantity vari-
ables. For technical reasons, we assume that F is strictly increasing and strictly concave
in each quantity variable in the interior of the type space, no output is produced without
resources, and standard Inada conditions apply.3
Of economic relevance is the assumption that production displays constant returns to
scale in the quantity variables. For example, if the output of each worker depends only
on his own type x, the type of the firm y , and how many resources the worker receives,
then constant returns to scale arise as twice the workers produce twice the output if the
resources per worker stay constant. Constant returns imply that the output in (1) can be
expressed as the product of the amount of resource r and the output per unit of resource:4
f (x yθ) := F(x yθ1) (2)
where θ = l/r represents the amount of workers per unit of resource, which we call the
intensity. In line with the interpretation in Lucas (1978), we interpret the intensity or span
3The requirement that F(x y l0) = 0 is made for convenience, as it rules out that workers are hired by
firms that devote no resources to them. This is only weakly concave in l, and therefore we can only assume strict
concavity in the interior. Finally, Inada conditions on labor are liml→0 Fl(x y l r) = ∞ for given x y r > 0,
and liml→∞ Fl(x y l r)= 0. Similar conditions can be placed on resources.
4If total output F(x y l r) has constant returns to scale, we can write it as F(x y l r)= rF(x y l/r1)=
rf (x yθ).
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of control of the manager as the size of the firm, as if we were explicitly talking about the
span of control of the CEO. Therefore, in what follows, we use intensity θ and firm size
interchangeably. As mentioned earlier, the function f (x yθ) represents the production
of a firm that only hires one type of worker, in which case it trivially spends all its resources
on this type (r = 1). Moreover, when r > 1, output F(x y l r) = rf (x y l/r) can be
viewed as the optimal output of r firms of type y that optimally employ l workers of type
y . Because of the tight link between f and F in (2), either can be used as the primitive of
the model.
One can interpret the resources r as the time available to the manager. This interpre-
tation follows the notion of span of control in Lucas (1978) and further developed in the
literature on knowledge hierarchies (Garicano (2000)). Resources are thus not the equiv-
alent of capital that can be bought on the market. The managerial resources are fixed,
and the only choice for management is how to assign those time resources to different
skill levels x.5 We do make clear the distinction between resources r and other generic
capital that can be purchased on the market in Section 4. There we also discuss an en-
dogenous choice of resources.
The action of a firm y is to choose two distributions, the number of workers of each
type and the amount of resources devoted to them. Let labor demand Ly(x) denote
the cumulative distribution of the number of workers that firm y hires of type x or
lower, and let resource allocation Ry(x) denote the cumulative distribution of the re-
sources that the firm dedicates to all workers of type x or lower. There is no loss to
the assumption that firms hire workers only if they devote resources to them, as work-
ers without resources produce no output (formally, this means that labor demand is ab-
solutely continuous in the resource allocation). The choices of Ly(x) and Ry(x) then
determine the number of workers per unit of resources θy(x) relevant in (2) through the
Radon–Nikodym derivative θy(x) := dLy(x)/dRy(x) almost everywhere. Conversely, the
number of workers per resource θy(x) and the allocation of resources Ry(x) fully sum-
marize the firm’s labor demand as the sum of workers-per-resource θy(x) over all re-
sources: Ly(x) = ∫ x
x
θ(x˜)dRy(x˜).6 We can therefore interchangeably use (Ly(·),Ry(·))
and (θy(·)Ry(·)) to represent the firm’s choices.
When a firm hires workers of multiple types, we assume that its total output is the
sum of the outputs across all its types. Additive separability again arises naturally if the
output of each worker depends only on his and the firm’s types and on the amount of
resources available to him. Such formulations allow for interactions between firm and
worker type, but abstract from interactions amongst workers except through the limited
resources. This abstraction is restrictive, but implies existence and—more importantly—
tractability for the analysis of all the other cross-complementarities between quantities
and qualities. Since F(x y l r) = rf (x yθ) is the output of one worker type, the sum
5Because of constant returns to scale (CRS) in quantity variables, an alternative interpretation of the model
is one where anyone can combine l units of workers x with r units of managers y to provide output F(x y l r),
and workers get paid the equilibrium wage and managers their equilibrium salaries. The operator of F obtains
no profits in equilibrium because of CRS and free entry, and all returns go to the scarce resources of worker
and managerial time. Our setup can then be interpreted as each manager operating her own firm, in which
case the firm profits coincide with the return to management time. While we fixed the time endowment per
manager at unity, this could be chosen endogenously. Our sorting conditions would not change, as they rely on
aggregate amounts of resources in equilibrium, but the discussion of firm size would have to be rescaled by the
endogenous choice of resources that each manager acquires.
6Since θy(x) = dLy(x)/dRy(x), one can use θy(x) to reconstruct labor demand as Ly(x) =∫
(xθ):x≤x˜ θ(x˜)dRy(x˜).
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across all worker types can formally be represented as
∫
f (x yθy(x))dRy(x) where, as
mentioned above, dRy(x) represents how the firm allocates resources across different
worker types.
COMPETITIVE MARKET EQUILIBRIUM. We consider a competitive equilibrium where
firms can hire a worker of type x at wage w(x). In equilibrium, firms’ hiring decisions
must be optimal and markets for each worker type must clear.7
Profit maximization of a firm of type y entails a choice of a production plan that max-
imizes output minus wage costs. For resources devoted to workers of type x at intensity
θ, the output is f (x yθ), but the firm must pay the wage w(x) to each of the θ workers
that produce with this resource. The optimal production strategy therefore solves
max
θy Ry
∫ [
f
(
x yθy(x)
)−w(x)θy(x)]dRy(x) (3)
The firm’s total wage bill
∫
w(x)θdRy consists of the wage w(x) integrated over the
density of its labor demand Ly(x) = ∫ x
x
θ(x˜)dRy(x˜). For later reference, it is useful to
note that a firm that only hires one worker type x has a workforce size of l(y)= θy(x).
Feasibility of the total allocation of resources requires that firms attempt to hire no
more workers than there are in the population. Consider any interval of worker types
(x′x]. A firm of type y has a demand for such workers of Ly(x)−Ly(x′). Integrated over
all firms, this yields the aggregate demand for such worker types. Therefore, labor demand
schedules L= {Ly}y∈Y are feasible if the implied aggregate demand does not exceed the
economy’s endowment with such worker types, for all x′x:∫
y
[Ly(x)−Ly(x′)]dHf ≤Hw(x)−Hw(x′) (4)
We can now define an equilibrium as follows:
DEFINITION 1: An equilibrium is a tuple of functions (wθyRyLy) consisting of a
nonnegative wage schedule w(x) as well as intensity functions θy(x) and resource alloca-
tions Ry(x) with associated feasible labor demands Ly(x) such that
1. Optimality: For any y , the combination (θyRy) solves (3).
2. Market Clearing: Equation (4) holds with equality if wages are strictly positive a.e.
on (x′x].
The market clearing condition simply states that if wages for some worker types are
positive, their markets clear. A useful feature of our setup is that firms’ preferences over
workers are convex, as shown in the Appendix, so that we can draw on classical results
on existence and welfare theorems, for example, Ostroy (1984) and Khan and Yannelis
(1991). Our main focus here is on characterization: When do better firms hire better
workers? How are the wages determined? When do better firms employ more employees?
How is that effected by quantity-biased technological change?
ASSORTATIVE MATCHING. Our focus is on labor demands that are monotonic in x and y .
There is Positive Assortative Matching if higher firm types employ higher worker types in
7We require wages to be nonnegative in order not to violate the workers’ outside option, which is normalized
to zero for all agents. Firms can achieve their outside option simply by hiring no workers. We will call worker
types with a zero wage and firm types with zero profits as inactive, while all other agents are called active.
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their production; that is, for almost all firm types y and y ′ with y > y ′, it holds that x is
in the support of Ly and x′ is in the support of Ly′ only if x ≥ x′. Negative Assortative
Matching can be defined by reversing the last inequality, capturing that lower type work-
ers are employed in higher type firms. This definition is suitable in the presence of mass
points in the type distributions.
A more natural and more tractable formulation of assortative matching arises if higher
types produce strictly more output and the type distributions have nonzero continuous
densities. We will focus on this case for expositional convenience, but our main sorting
result in Proposition 1 holds without these restrictions. With these restrictions, higher
types are more valuable and therefore there exist boundary types xˆ and yˆ such that all
higher types are active. Assume that almost all active firm types y hire exactly one worker
type ν(y) and reach size l(y). We prove in the Appendix (Lemma 3) that this must hold if
there is assortative matching. An equivalent but simpler notion of assortative matching is
therefore that ν(y) exists and is strictly monotone for almost all active types.
Traditionally, models are solved from the perspective of the workers, for which the
above discussions imply that, for almost all active types x, we can define the inverse
μ = ν−1 so that we can interpret μ(x) as the firm type that hires worker type x. The
intensity for this worker is the worker intensity θ(x) := θμ(x)(x). Clearly, μ inherits the
strict monotonicity of ν, and as mentioned earlier, intensity equals firm size so that
θ(x) = l(μ(x)). The market clearing condition now becomes particularly tractable. For
the case of PAM, for example, it reduces to∫ y
μ(x)
θ(s)hf (s)ds =
∫ x
x
hw(s)ds (5)
where the right-hand side sums up all workers above x and the left-hand side sums up
all firms that hire these workers times the number of workers each hires. In the case of
one-to-one matching as in Becker, θ= 1 and therefore ∫ x
x
hw(s)ds = ∫ y
μ(x)
hf (s)ds implies
Hw(x) = Hf(μ(x)). With variable firm size θ(x), this now means that we are matching
one firm to θ(x) workers.8
3. THE MAIN RESULTS
Models of assortative matching are in general difficult to characterize completely.
Therefore, the literature has tried to identify conditions under which sorting is assorta-
tive. These conditions help our understanding of the underlying driving sources of sorting.
And if the appropriate conditions are fulfilled, they substantially reduce the complexity
of the assignment problem and allow further characterization of the equilibrium. In this
section, we first derive necessary and sufficient conditions for assortative matching, and
then we characterize the assortative equilibrium allocation. The objective is double. We
aim to obtain conditions on assortative matching and whether larger firms tend to hire
more productive workers. This will give us a simple taxonomy when there is PAM and
worker types are increasing or decreasing in firm size, and when there is NAM and again
worker types are increasing or decreasing in firm size. We summarize our results in Ta-
ble I. Our second objective is to provide a system of differential equations that solves for
the equilibrium allocation μ, the firm size distribution θ, and the wage schedule w.
8Like in our model, the mechanical relation that pins down matching in Becker (1973) no longer holds even
in the one-to-one matching model when types are multi-dimensional. See Lindenlaub (2016) and Eeckhout
and Jovanovic (2011).
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3.1. Assortative Matching
Our main result on sorting provides a necessary and sufficient condition that applies to
arbitrary type distributions, and places no restrictions on how types influence output. To
build up intuition, we focus on necessary conditions for assortative matching in the case
discussed at the end of the previous section: higher types produce more output and dis-
tributions have nonzero continuous densities. As outlined earlier, in an assortative equi-
librium we can define, for almost all active worker types, the function μ(x) that denotes
the firm type that hires worker x. Employment is at intensity θ(x) = θμ(x)(x) > 0 at the
equilibrium wage w(x) > 0. The strict inequalities arise because otherwise either worker
or firm payoff would be zero, which would violate that these types are active. In an equi-
librium with positive sorting, μ(x) is strictly increasing. When output is increasing in x,
w(x) is increasing as better types necessarily earn higher wages. Monotone functions are
differentiable almost everywhere. Therefore, for almost any active x, there exists an open
neighborhood in which the following arguments based on differentiability are valid.
For this to be an equilibrium outcome, the firms’ choices must maximize their opti-
mization problem (3). The next lemma—which also holds for arbitrary distributions and
production functions—establishes that we can focus on a simplified problem.
LEMMA 1: Consider an active firm with strategy (θyRy) that maximizes (3). Almost ev-
erywhere in the support ofRy , it has to hold that (xθy(x)) solves
max
x˜θ˜
f (x˜ y θ˜)− θ˜w(x˜) (6)
PROOF: In Appendix. Q.E.D.
This lemma states that firms do not choose worker type and intensity unless the combi-
nation maximizes the return per unit of resource, which implies that firms with a unique
optimizer for (6) hire only one worker type, and therefore endogenously brings our setup
in line with one that assumes a uniform workforce from the start. To be clear, this is a
result and not a restriction that we impose. The main reason why firms pick only one and
not multiple worker types x is because output is additively separable across different x.
Therefore, given wages w(x), if a firm generates the highest possible profits from match-
ing with type x, then it would do worse from also hiring worker types x′ 	= x. Of course,
this differentiation results because we lack any direct complementarity between worker
types.
Given that we can focus on the optimization problem (6) with firms choosing only one
type x to match with, our solution now must find which x and how many of those, θ. Our
objective is to establish positive or negative sorting, where the allocation μ(x) is single
valued, but for now there is no restriction on μ. Optimality requires that the choices solve
the first-order conditions with respect to x and θ:
fθ
(
xμ(x)θ(x)
)−w(x) = 0 (7)
fx
(
xμ(x)θ(x)
)− θ(x)w′(x) = 0 (8)
where functions with lowercase letters denote partial derivatives (e.g., fx = ∂f/∂x). Note
that these equalities hold within the neighborhood around x. The implicit function the-
orem applied to (7) establishes that θ(x) is locally differentiable, and then the implicit
function theorem applied to (8) implies that w′(x) is once more locally differentiable.
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A necessary condition for optimality of the first-order conditions is that the Hessian is
positive definite, and in particular that its determinant is positive:
fθθ
[
fxx − θw′′(x)
]− [fxθ −w′(x)]2 ≥ 0 (9)
where the argument (xμ(x)θ(x)) of f and its derivatives is suppressed for notational
convenience. While this still entails the endogenous wage schedule, one can differentiate
the first-order conditions along the equilibrium path and use this to substitute out the
wage schedule to obtain equivalently (see Appendix for the derivation):
μ′(x)
⎡
⎢⎢⎣fxy −
fyθ
(
fxθ − fx
θ
)
fθθ
⎤
⎥⎥⎦≥ 0 (10)
Since PAM requires μ′(x) > 0, a necessary condition is that the square bracket is weakly
positive. This places restrictions on the production technology f of firms with only one
worker type. The term fxy is familiar from one-to-one matching models and—if positive—
captures that higher firm types value higher worker types more. This is not enough to
ensure PAM. It also matters to which extent higher types value the size of the firm. Intu-
itively, if higher type firms obtain higher value from being large but higher worker types
are more productive in small firms, then this counteracts the familiar force. This can be
seen even more easily when using (2) to express this in terms of the original production
function F . The next proposition makes this point, states this as a necessary and sufficient
condition, dispenses with assumptions on the type distribution, and does not require out-
put to increase in types:
PROPOSITION 1: A necessary condition to have equilibria with positive assortative match-
ing under any arbitrary distribution of types is that the following inequality holds:
Fxy ≥ FylFxr
Flr
(11)
for all (x y l r) ∈R4++. With a strict inequality, it is also sufficient to ensure that any equilib-
rium entails positive assortative matching. The opposite inequality provides a necessary and
sufficient condition for negative assortative matching.
PROOF: In Appendix. Q.E.D.
The proof has to deal with possible mass points in the type distributions which can lead
to multiple firm types choosing a given worker type in equilibrium. More importantly, the
argument above only shows that the derivative of the matching function μ(x) has to be
positive when equation (11) holds wherever this derivative is defined. In a positive assor-
tative equilibrium, this derivative is defined almost everywhere and equation (11) is nec-
essary at these points. To ensure this under all type distributions, we show in the Appendix
that equation (11) is necessary everywhere. Equation (11) does not immediately guaran-
tee sufficiency since it does not rule out that the matching can have a discontinuity with
a discrete jump downward, which requires a global rather than a local argument. In the
Appendix, we deal with these issues by exploiting the implication of the First Welfare The-
orem that any equilibrium allocation maximizes output in this economy with quasi-linear
utility. If (11) fails but allocations have mass around points that are positive assortative,
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there are strict efficiency gains from rearranging production in a negative assortative way.
If (11) holds strictly but mass is placed around negative sorting, efficiency can be improved
by rearranging production in a positive assortative way. These properties are easy to show
in one-to-one matching models where production always requires r = l = 1 and the local
PAM requirement of Fxy > 0 can be integrated from xl to xr and from yl to yr to yield the
global implication that F(xh yh11)+F(xl yl11) > F(xh yl11)+F(xl yh11) for
any xh > xl and yh > yl, meaning that output increases when types are matched positively
assorted. When the quantity dimension is active and r can differ from l, the new sorting
condition (11) is more involved and cannot simply be integrated, requiring a substantially
more involved argument despite the similarity in spirit.
As in the standard Becker (1973) model with one-to-one matching, equation (11) in
Proposition 1 is a functional equation, and the inequality may not be satisfied everywhere
on the support of F . That may still lead to PAM (or NAM) for a given distribution, but
for an arbitrary distribution there will not always be a monotonic sorting pattern. The
conditions we derive below apply when the sorting pattern is monotone, and as such, the
characterization that we obtain below in Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 is complete only
under monotonicity.
INTERPRETATION: Condition (11) embodies the quantity-quality tradeoff that the firm
makes, and this is captured by all four possible combinations of pairwise complementar-
ities: one within qualities, two across quality-quantity dimensions, and one within quan-
tities. Observe that, as in the one-to-one matching model (Becker (1973)), both positive
and negative assorted allocations constitute an equilibrium if the condition holds with
equality. Hence, the condition is only sufficient when it holds strictly.
On the left-hand side, a large value of the cross-partial derivative on the quality dimen-
sions (Fxy) captures strong type complementarity and means that higher firm types have,
ceteris paribus, a higher marginal return for matching with higher worker types. The two
terms in the numerator on the right-hand side represent the complementary interaction
across qualities and quantities. The cross-partial Fyl captures the span of control comple-
mentarity. If it is large, it means that higher firm types have a higher marginal valuation
for the quantity of workers. That is, better firms value the number of “bodies” that work
for them especially highly. In this case, better firms would like to employ many workers.
The managerial resource complementarity Fxr expresses how the marginal product of man-
agerial time varies across better workers. If managerial time is particularly productive
when spent with high skilled types, then it is positive and large. This would be the case,
for example, if learning by high types is faster.9 Notably, if better firms particularly value a
large size but better workers who particularly excel with plentiful resources (implying few
co-workers and, therefore, smaller firms), this creates a tension that counteracts positive
assortative matching.
The term in the denominator captures the complementarity in quantities, and acts mostly
as a normalization since only its magnitude varies but its sign is always strictly positive
due to constant returns to scale in quantities. Since this term is tightly linked to the con-
cavity in labor holding resources fixed, it captures the extent to which additional labor
decreases the value of output.10 The overall condition (11) can be interpreted like the
9This type of complementarity is often discussed in the context of teaching in the classroom. If a low-ability
student reaches his limits earlier than a high-ability student, then additional instructor time might be more
worthwhile when it is devoted to the high-ability student (Fxr > 0). If high-ability students do well without fur-
ther input while low-ability students crucially need the instructor’s time, then additional time by the instructor
might be more worthwhile with the low-ability students (Fxr < 0). Clearly, in this context the output measure
is not as clear as in a production setting, and considerations of fairness and equity play an additional role.
10Due to constant returns to scale, Frl(x y l r)= −Fll(x y l r)l/r.
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Spence–Mirrlees single-crossing condition, adjusted for the additional complication that
there are three goods that firms care about: the number of workers, the type of worker,
and the numeraire.11
The condition for positive assortative matching then compares the within-
complementarities with the across-complementarities. In the absence of a quantity di-
mension (e.g., as in Becker (1973)), the right-hand side of the inequality is zero. With a
quantity dimension, the requirements for positive assortative matching now depend on
how much substitutability there is of quality for quantity, that is, the ability to substitute
additional workers to make up for their lower quality, and which worker types are most
negatively affected when additional workers are added. If size is important and better
workers lose more in productivity when they receive fewer resources, then the traditional
type complementarity Fxy must be strong enough for good firms to still employ these
types. Substitutability along the quantity dimensions are key to this tradeoff. The discus-
sion in Section 4 reveals that as the elasticity of substitution on the quantity dimension
goes to zero—in the limit there is no substitution and agents can only be matched into
pairs—the right-hand side goes to zero.
One may wonder what happens when our homogeneity assumption does not hold and
output is not proportional to the ratio θ of the labor force l to the amount of resources r.
Conceptually, the problem is identical to the one we solve here (see the Appendix for
the derivation). While the interpretation is much less transparent, the main sorting con-
dition (47) is still necessary for differential positive assortative matching under increasing
returns to scale; only the steps that require homogeneity do not apply.
Finally, our condition (11) depends on four cross-partials, but given four inputs, there
are six different possible cross-partials. Why are these four in the condition and why are
the other two—namely, Fxl and Fyr—not in the condition? The derivation of the condition
exploits the constant returns assumption of F in l r, which renders it tractable. However,
the constant returns assumption also links the missing derivatives to those found in the
condition. To see this, observe that constant returns imply we can write F = lFl + rFr from
Euler’s Theorem for homogeneous functions. Taking the derivative with respect to x and
rearranging, we obtain Fxr = Fx−lFxlr . Similarly, when taking the derivative with respect to
y , we obtain Fyl = Fy−rFyrl . Now condition (11) is equivalent to
Fxy ≥ (Fy − rFyr)(Fx − lFxl)
lrFlr
(12)
or any combination of cross-partials, for example,
Fxy ≥ Fyl(Fx − lFxl)
lrFlr
 (13)
11In a standard Spence–Mirlees analysis, agents care only about two dimensions. For example, think about
an alternative model in which agents of type y maximize f (x yθ) and have a budget set M and feasible
(xθ)-combinations that only include those that satisfy θw(x) = M . In this case, the standard single-crossing
condition on f would suffice. Our condition can be thought of as a three-good extension of the Spence–Mirlees
condition, where firms can choose different budget levels in terms of the numeraire on top of choosing θ and x.
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While this gives another dimension to interpretation of the mechanism, it should be
stressed that these expressions are identical because we use the identity that follows from
the constant returns assumption.12
3.2. Equilibrium Assignment, Firm Size Distribution, and Wage Profile
In contrast to models with pairwise matching where assortativeness immediately im-
plies who matches with whom (the best with the best, the second best with the second
best, and so forth), the matching pattern is not immediate in this framework as particular
firms may hire more or less workers in equilibrium. Our main focus is the characteriza-
tion. For the following, we will consider output functions that are strictly increasing in
types and distributions with continuous nonzero densities, which ensures that all agents
match provided their type exceeds some cutoff. If output can fall for higher types, hold-
ing all other variables constant, then there might be holes in the matching set, and the
following characterization can only be applied on each connected component. The re-
sults hold even if output can fall, as long as it could be ensured that on the equilibrium
path, all agents above some cut-off can match. The next proposition fully characterizes
the equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 2: If matching is assortative and output is strictly increasing in types, then the
factor intensity (firm size), equilibrium assignment, and wages are determined by the following
system of differential equations evaluated along the equilibrium allocation at almost all types:
PAM : θ′(x)= H(x)Fyl − Fxr
Flr
; μ′(x)= H(x)
θ(x)
; w′(x)= Fx
θ(x)
 (14)
NAM : θ′(x)= −H(x)Fyl + Fxr
Flr
; μ′(x)= −H(x)
θ(x)
; w′(x)= Fx
θ(x)
 (15)
whereH(x)= hw(x)/hf (μ(x)).
PROOF: In Appendix. Q.E.D.
This first-order differential equation system in μ and θ together with appropriate
boundary conditions can be used to compute an equilibrium.13 Proposition 2 is stated
from the point of view of workers, and θ(x) is the size of the firm in which worker
type x is employed. From the firm’s perspective, the firm size is l(y) = θ(ν(y)) where
ν(y) is the inverse of μ(x). Applying the chain rule then immediately implies that
l′(y)= θ′(ν(y))θ(ν(y))/H(ν(y)) in the case of PAM and the same but with opposite sign
in the case of NAM. This immediately generates the following corollary on the size of
different firm types:
12At face value, condition (11) can be interpreted as the geometric average of the “own” cross-partials (i.e.,
within quantity and quality) to be at least as large as the geometric average of the “across” cross-partials (i.e.,
across quantity and quality).
13For PAM, one boundary condition is μ(x¯) = y¯ . For a guess of θ(x¯), an equilibrium allocation must solve
the first-order differential equation system in μ and θ for all lower worker types. Along the differential equa-
tion, wages w(x) and firm profits π(μ(x)) ≡ f (xμ(x)θ(x)) − θ(x)w(x) have to be positive. The guess for
θ(x¯) must be such that at the lowest active type xˆ, the differential equation stops at one of three possible end-
point conditions: xˆ > x and w(xˆ)= 0 as not all worker types are used in production, xˆ= x and μ(xˆ) > y with
π(μ(xˆ))= 0 as not all firm types are used in production, or xˆ= x and μ(xˆ)= y .
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COROLLARY 1: If matching is assortative and output is increasing in types, better firms hire
more workers if and only if, along the equilibrium path:
1. H(ν(y))Fyl > Fxr under PAM,
2. H(ν(y))Fyl >−Fxr under NAM.
To gain intuition, these results can be interpreted as follows. Consider the case of PAM,
and to simplify the exposition we set H(x) = 1 by assuming uniform type distributions,
which can be interpreted as a normalization.14 First, if better firms have a higher marginal
value of hiring many workers (the span of control complementarity Fyl is large), this gives
rise to better firms being large. Nevertheless, under PAM, these firms also hire better
workers. If these workers have a higher marginal value from obtaining many resources
of the firm (Fxr large), then the firm will tend to be smaller. Clearly, if Fxr is negative,
meaning that better workers need fewer resources, this generates an even stronger force
for firm size to increase in y . Under NAM, the first effect is the same, but now better firms
are matched with worse workers. In this case, firms become exceptionally large if better
workers need more resources, meaning that worse workers need fewer resources.
Propositions 1 and 2 provide us with a description of the economy expressed in four
interaction terms, FxyFxrFyl, and Flr , which determine the sorting patterns and the size
distribution. These patterns can be used to discuss the determinants that are likely to drive
matching in various industries. For example, the most productive firms in the retail mar-
ket have invested heavily in information technologies to monitor cash registers, logistics
of stocks, and employee performance. This allows a single store manager to supervise a
large number of employees, which in our model is captured by a large Fyl term. Since top
retailers such as Walmart actually pay low wages and hire low skilled employees compared
to smaller and less profitable mom-and-pop stores, NAM seems to prevail. From condi-
tion (11), we therefore infer that the type complementarity Fxy is not too high relative
to the span of control complementarity Fyl. Since top retailers also operate much larger
businesses, by the previous corollary we would infer that their span of control complemen-
tarity must be larger than the negative of the managerial resource complementarity Fxr .
In other industries such as management consulting or in law firms, matching appears
positive assortative, since top firms hire top graduates. From this we infer that the type
complementarity Fxy must be large. While it seems natural that the best managers benefit
more from having many team members in order to leverage their skills (Fyl > 0), they also
benefit from spending time with the very talented team that they assembled to transfer
their knowledge (Fxr > 0). The type complementarity must be large to outweigh the prod-
uct FylFxr . Firm size changes according to Fyl − Fxr . The fact that top consultancy firms
do not operate much larger groups than lower level ones indicates that the difference
between these two complementarities is small.
Interestingly, if matching is PAM, the distributions HwHf are uniform, and Fyl = Fxr
holds exactly, then the economy operates as in a one-to-one matching model: the ratio of
workers to resources is constant, the assignment and the wages are as in Becker (1973).
The reason is that the improvements of the firm in taking on more workers are exactly
14Intuitively, we can always call workers and firms by their rank in the type distribution. Start with an econ-
omy with production function F and type distributions Hw and Hf with continuous nonzero densities. Give
each worker x a new name xˆ that corresponds to her rank in the type distribution: xˆ(x) = Hw(x). For firms
use similarly yˆ(y) = Hf (y). Now production is Fˆ(xˆ yˆ l r) = F((Hw)−1(xˆ) (Hf )−1(yˆ) l r), where (Hw)−1
and (Hf )−1 are the inverse of Hw and Hf , respectively. Clearly, the new economy with “names” xˆ and yˆ and
production Fˆ generates exactly the same output, but type distributions are by construction uniform.
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE THEORETICAL RESULTS
PAM NAM
Worker types increase with Fxy >
FylFxr
Flr
Fxy <
FylFxr
Flr
firm size: θ′(x) > 0 HFyl > Fxr HFyl <−Fxr
Worker types decrease with Fxy >
FylFxr
Flr
Fxy <
FylFxr
Flr
firm size: θ′(x) < 0 HFyl < Fxr HFyl >−Fxr
offset by the advantages of the workers to obtain more resources. Since the size distribu-
tion does not vary across types, the remuneration also does not stray from the one that
arises if we exogenously imposed a one-to-one matching ratio.
A final observation concerns the role of the type distribution when it is not normalized.
An immediate implication of interest of these equilibrium conditions is that the size dis-
tribution θ(y) may change even if we hold the production function and the distribution
of firm type constant. This occurs when the distribution of workers changes. In particular,
for some distributions of worker skills, better firms will be smaller, while for other distri-
butions, better firms might be larger. Even if the technological determinants of firms and
their production capabilities are identical in two economies, as is often assumed in the
misallocation debate mentioned in the Introduction, the firm size distribution can vary
even without distortions in the economy, once the skill distribution is taken into account.
We will return to this and how the model can be used to analyze some issues within this
debate below.
We can summarize our results on assortative matching and the size distribution in Ta-
ble I.
EXAMPLES. We now illustrate, for a specific technology, how the equilibrium allocation
changes. The technology is multiplicatively separable in the qualitative inputs and the
quantitative inputs, with the quantitative inputs CES and the qualitative inputs Cobb–
Douglas:
f (x yθ)= (ωAx(1−σA)/σA + (1 −ωA)y(1−σA)/σA)σA/(1−σA)θωθ (16)
In this setting, condition (11) that governs PAM versus NAM is particularly straightfor-
ward: there is PAM if σA < 1 and NAM if σA > 1. We illustrate three cases: 1. variation
of ωA under PAM; 2. variation of σA under PAM; and 3. variation of ωθ under NAM.15
Figure 1 illustrates that as the share parameter governing the weight on worker qual-
ity in production decreases (ωA goes down), productive firms (high y = μ(x), and under
PAM, also higher x) become larger. The equilibrium allocation μ(x) therefore shifts up-
wards as the more productive firms use up more skilled workers. The logic is that as the
marginal product of labor decreases, firms substitute quality for quantity and hire more
workers. The general equilibrium effect is that the more productive firms become larger
and the less productive firms become smaller.
Note that, at ωA = 05, the size is constant across firms, θ′ = 0. There is no particular
relevance to a share parameter of ωA = 05, except that in this particular specification
with a lot of symmetry built in already (with identical, uniform distributions for x and
15The figures that analyze variation of ωA under NAM, variation of σA under NAM, and variation of ωθ
under PAM are similar and available in the Supplemental Material (Eeckhout and Kircher (2017)).
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FIGURE 1.—For different values of ωA, PAM Allocation μ(x) and intensity/size θ. Simulation with both
Hf Hw uniform on [01], ωθ = 05, and σA = 09.
y and ωθ = 12 ), it renders the technology fully symmetric: the production function F re-
mains unchanged if the roles of workers and firms are reversed. Under such symmetry,
the tradeoff between better and more workers exactly balances and firm size remains con-
stant for all types. This can straightforwardly (though tediously) be derived. If ωA < 05,
then the size effect dominates, and the opposite holds for ωA > 05. By changing any of
the other conditions to break the symmetry, it is nevertheless possible to have firm size
increasing in firm type even if ωA > 05.
Figure 2 depicts the effect on the equilibrium allocation of a decrease in the degree
of complementarity between worker skills x and firm productivity y . As the degree of
complementarity increases, that is, σA decreases, more productive firms hire more work-
ers. Due to higher complementarity, the demand for skilled labor has gone up and firms
hire more. Of course, given limited supply, size cannot increase for all firms. Mediated by
higher wages, lower productivity firms in equilibrium hire fewer workers and they are of
lower skill x.
And as ωθ increases, the penalty for large firm size is reduced and overall labor de-
mand is raised. In the limit, this eliminates decreasing returns and eventually allocates all
labor to the best firms. For our parameter constellations with PAM, this is monotone: any
increase in ωθ shifts the allocation in this direction in the sense that good firms become
larger and workers are matched to better firms (the corresponding figure is omitted to
save space).
FIGURE 2.—For different values of σA, PAM Allocation μ(x) and intensity/size θ. Simulation with both
Hf Hw uniform on [01], ωA = 03, and ωθ = 06.
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FIGURE 3.—For different values of ωθ, NAM Allocation μ(x) and intensity/size θ. Simulation with both
Hf Hw uniform on [01], ωA = 05, and σA = 11.
When types are substitutes (σA > 1), the allocation is NAM and the effect of increasing
ωθ becomes more subtle. The size distribution is shaped by market clearing and the fact
that, under negative sorting, the best firms hire the worst workers. This is evident for a
given parameter configuration in Figure 3, where the allocation and size distribution do
not follow a monotone pattern in ωθ. As ωθ increases, more mass is shifted towards high
productivity (small) firms, away from low productivity (large) firms. In the right panel,
we see more at the top for higher μ firms and less at the bottom as ωθ increases. For
mid-level firms, the shift is not necessarily monotone: it depends on how many workers
from lower type firms are shifted up to the middle firms and how many are moved from
the middle further up. Eventually, as ωθ approaches unity, the more productive firms
will attract all the workers, and the slope of the size distribution θ′(μ) will change from
negative to positive.
The next two sections are devoted to showing that the general setup that we studied,
our main theory, is flexible enough to encompass a large range of environments. Section 4
highlights that our model captures many existing environments as special cases and allows
the introduction of two-sided heterogeneity into many competitive economies that have
so far been analyzed without them. The most elaborate extension that incorporates search
frictions is presented in Section 5.
4. DISCUSSION: SPECIAL CASES AND RELATION TO THE LITERATURE
In this section, we discuss the relation to the existing literature, we present simple ex-
tensions, and we highlight the applicability of our framework to economic issues such as
mismatch of factor inputs, the measurement of the skill premium, and economic geogra-
phy. Wherever possible, we derive existing models as special cases within our own setup.
This documents how our model nests a number of models that have been extensively used
in the literature. It also highlights that our model can capture new settings that have not
been analyzed before. The introduction of search frictions and unemployment is, because
of its theoretical and economic significance, the most substantial application, separately
presented in Section 5.
EFFICIENCY UNITS OF LABOR have been long-standing instruments to incorporate dif-
ferences in labor productivity (see, e.g., Stigler (1961)) and are still a prevalent assump-
tion in many models in macro and labor economics. In such formulations, a firm of type
y that hires several worker types xi at quantities li produces output according to some
function F˜(y
∑
xili). That means that workers of a given skill are exactly replaceable
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by a number of workers of a different skill proportional to their skill difference: work-
ers with half the skill level are perfect substitutes as long as there are twice as many of
them. Our setup captures this case when F(x y l r) = rF˜(yxl/r). Clearly, if only one
worker type is hired, the unit amount of internal resources is concentrated on them and
we replicate the output F˜(yxl). With multiple worker types xi at quantities li, the firm
devotes its resources optimally between them, and it can be shown that the resulting out-
put is indeed F˜(y
∑
xili) (see Appendix A.11).16 It can easily be verified that in this case
our sorting condition is satisfied exactly with equality (FxyFlr = FylFxr), which captures the
well-known fact that sorting is arbitrary: each firm cares only about the total amount of
efficiency units, but not whether they are obtained by few high type workers or many low
type workers.
ONE-TO-ONE MATCHING models originating from Kantorovich (1942), Koopmans and
Beckmann (1957), Shapley and Shubik (1972), and Becker (1973) introduced a meaning-
ful interaction between worker and firm types and have been informative for analyzing
interactions in markets with two-sided heterogeneity.17 They restrict attention to settings
where agents must be matched in pairs, which limits insights into the size of the firm and
its capital intensity.18 Within our setup, one-to-one matching can be captured with the
functional form F(x ymin{l r}min{r l}) = F(x y11)min{l r} so that each unit of
labor needs exactly one unit of resource to be productive, and vice versa. This Leontief
formulation is only weakly concave, but its well-known sorting condition Fxy > 0 arises in
the limit as our production function approaches this, which is most easily shown in the
limit of the following two special cases.
MULTIPLICATIVE SEPARABILITY of the form F(x y l r)=A(xy)B(l r) provides par-
ticular tractability, and the one-to-one matching case in the previous section can be viewed
as a special case where the quantity dimension B(l r) is Leontief. In the multiplicative
case, the condition (11) for positive assortative matching is also multiplicatively separable
and can be written as [AAxy/(AxAy)][BBlr/(BlBr)] ≥ 1.19
CONSTANT ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION IN QUANTITIES for the multiplicatively sep-
arable case arises if B(l r)’s elasticity is constant and equal to ε; the sorting condition
then reduces to AAxy/(AxAy)≥ ε, or equivalently FFxy/(FxFy)≥ ε as the quantity term
B cancels. This allows us to capture two special cases of particular relevance. The one-to-
one matching model discussed earlier arises as the elasticity of substitution approaches
zero, in which case B becomes Leontief and the sorting condition reduces to the well-
known Fxy ≥ 0. Another special case is the Cobb–Douglas specification where B = lγr1−γ ,
which arises either by assumption as in Grossman, Helpman, and Kircher (2016) that
builds on this special case of our work, or when output is linear in the amount of work-
ers but is valued in the market at decreasing returns due to CES preferences of final
16A generalized version of this setup is a production function f˜ (x¯ yL) that takes as inputs the average
type x¯ =∑xili/∑ li and the total labor L =∑ li , whereas standard efficiency units only feature the product
x¯L. (We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.) While our framework does not replicate the
generalized case when multiple types are hired, our sorting condition remains valid as long as f˜ is convex in its
first argument, as discussed in the Appendix.
17For a recent review article, see Chade, Eeckhout, and Smith (2016).
18Notice that the matching models by Tervio (2008) and Gabaix and Landier (2008), which explain the
changes of CEO compensation, are of this kind. While they use firm size to determine the type of firm, only
one worker (the CEO) is matched to one firm, where the firm size is exogenously given.
19In directed search with two-sided heterogeneity, a similar separable formulation arises where B represents
the matching technology (see Eeckhout and Kircher (2010)).
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consumers, as, for example, in Costinot (2009). Either case generates an elasticity of sub-
stitution of unity and the sorting condition reduces to FFxy/(FxFy) ≥ 1, or equivalently
log-supermodularity of F in worker and firm types, which is the well-known condition in
this literature.
SUPERVISION-TIME MODELS have been amongst the first to allow sorting in the pres-
ence of interaction with more than one worker. Here the firm or its manager has a unit
amount of time to supervise workers. The supervision time t(x y) needed by each worker
depends on both the manager’s and the worker’s type. So r units of time allow the hiring of
(no more than) r/t(x y) workers, and this determines firm size, which is no longer a real
choice variable once types are known. Sattinger’s (1975) seminal work assumed that out-
put equals size: F(x y l r)= min{r/t(x y) l}. If we approximate this non-differentiable
output function by the inelastic limit of a CES production function with inputs r/t(x y)
and l,20 sorting condition (11) requires t(x y) to be log-supermodular in the inelastic
limit, recovering Sattinger’s condition. Related is Garicano’s (2000) model of problem
solving that has been widely applied in the macro and trade literature (e.g., Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)). Here super-
vision time t(x) only depends on the worker’s ability to solve problems, but managers
themselves contribute directly to production by solving problems up to level y , leading to
output function F(x y l r) = y min{r/t(x) l}. Again, approximation through a smooth
CES function recovers their condition that sorting is always positive. The beauty of these
models is that they incorporate sorting and their explicit structure allows extensions, for
example, to multiple hierarchical levels, but size is directly tied to types and does not allow
a smooth extensive margin that is the heart of most macro models.
“SMOOTH” SPAN OF CONTROL underlies much of the work in macroeconomics on firm
size distributions and is inspired by Lucas’s (1978) seminal work.21 He assumed that man-
agers with different types leverage their time smoothly over a (homogeneous) workforce,
which can be captured through F = ylϕ(r/l), where ϕ summarizes decreasing returns
due to span of control problems. With the specification ϕ(r/l) = (r/l)1−γ , this recovers
the common form in which a firm with a unit amount of resources has decreasing returns
in labor of form ylγ . Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2011) extended the Lucas model to allow
for worker heterogeneity, but worker skills are perfectly substitutable, as in models of
efficiency units of labor, so there is no sorting of managers and workers. Rosen’s (1982)
supervision model can be interpreted as introducing heterogeneous worker types into this
framework through his production function F = ylϕ(g(y)r/lx)22 Parameterization with
ϕ= min{ r
lt(x)
1} would exactly replicate Garicano (2000), but instead, Rosen imposed the
smoothness assumptions of standard neoclassical theory. Rosen never analyzed his gen-
eral version, but additionally assumed efficiency units of labor. Within our framework, we
can apply our sorting condition (11) to study sorting in his general model, which yields
ϕ12[ϕ1 − ϕ/[g(y)r/l]] ≥ ϕ2ϕ11, where subscripts denote partial derivatives of ϕ and its
arguments (g(y)r/lx) are suppressed. Careful inspection of this condition yields many
20The function F(x y l r)= ([r/t(x y)](ε−1)/ε + l(ε−1)/ε)ε/(ε−1) approaches min{(r/t(x y) l} as ε→ 0.
21Here we interpret span of control in the sense of Lucas (1978), that is, the number of workers managed.
This also encompasses the interpretation by Simon (1957) and Lydall (1959) who referred to the number of
managers at a lower management level who are supervised by a manager in the next higher level. In that early
literature, span of control is related to the shape of a hierarchy and the Pareto coefficient describing the wage
distribution in a hierarchy.
22Rosen’s (1982) equation (1) for output per worker can be written as g˜(y˜)ϕ(y˜l/rx) where y˜ is the firm
type. For a strictly monotone function g˜, we can relabel each firm type as y = g˜(y˜) so that output per worker
is yϕ(g(y)r/lx) where g = g˜−1 which yields the expression in the text.
104 J. EECKHOUT AND P. KIRCHER
insights: a positive ϕ12 is intuitively conducive to positive sorting as it captures the interac-
tion between g(y) and x, but this turns out only to be true if the elasticity of ϕ with respect
to its first argument is above unity. Otherwise, decreasing returns to size kick in too much
and the square bracket is negative, revealing again the importance of size considerations
for sorting. The converse that sorting influences firm size distributions might also seem
plausible, but again has not received any attention, possibly due to a lack of theory that
allows for sorting in conjunction with span of control. Empirical work on firm size distri-
butions tends to use the span of control approach since firm heterogeneity can rationalize
size differences. Input heterogeneity in such studies is usually absent or restricted to ef-
ficiency units. To illustrate the role of such heterogeneity, one can study changes within
a country over time or between countries of different levels of development. We briefly
touch on the latter after discussing the role of generic capital in the model.
THE SKILL PREMIUM WITH GENERIC CAPITAL INVESTMENT. Additional generic cap-
ital inputs can be easily introduced as other factors of production into our framework.
Consider a production process that not only takes as inputs the amount of labor and
of proprietary firm resources, but also some amount k of a generic capital good, and
creates output Fˆ(x y l rk). In this formulation, k is allowed to be a vector in case
there is more than one capital good. Optimal use of resources requires F(x y l r) =
maxk[Fˆ(x y l rk) − i′k], where i is the vector of unit prices which the individual firm
takes as given and is either fixed to world market levels in a small open economy or other-
wise determined by an additional equilibrium condition that equates the capital demand
across all firms to the aggregate capital stock. Note that F is constant returns in the last
two arguments if Fˆ is constant returns in the last three arguments, and all the machinery
in this paper can be applied. Recall the alternative interpretation of our model (see foot-
note 5) in which any entrepreneur can hire input 1 at type x at quantity l and input 2 of
type r at quantity y to maximize Fˆ(x y l rk)− lwx(x)− rwy(y)− i′k, where wx and wy
are the hedonic price schedules for each of the inputs (equal to the wages and profits in
our derivation). Labeling input 1 as “high-skilled” workers and input 2 as “low-skilled”
workers, this exactly captures the within-period interaction in the seminal work on the
skill premium following Krusell et al. (2000), only there it was assumed that individuals
within each group are homogeneous. Our setup allows for within-group heterogeneity,
when the skill premium wy(y)/wx(x) becomes type-specific. Our sorting condition can
be expressed in terms of F as defined above. If there is only one generic capital good
and k is simply a number, then rewriting the cross-margin-complementarity condition
(11) in terms of the new primitive yields the following condition for positive assortative
matching: FˆxyFˆlr Fˆkk − FˆxyFˆlkFˆrk − FˆxkFˆykFˆlr ≥ FˆxrFˆylFˆkk − FˆxrFˆykFˆlk − FˆxkFˆylFˆrk. This is
obtained from applying equation (11) to F together with the fact that F solves the max-
imization problem maxk[Fˆ(x y l rk)− i′k]. We expect that particular functional form
assumptions for the way that generic capital affects the production process will simplify
this condition and make it more amenable for interpretation in specific cases.
THE MISALLOCATION DEBATE refers to empirical work that identified a nontrivial tail
of large firms in the United States and other developed countries, whereas such a tail is
absent in developing countries where size is compressed at very low levels (e.g., Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008)). The
same holds for agricultural farms (Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014)). Span of control
models have been unable to rationalize the differences, raising the worry about misallo-
cation of inputs away from the most productive firms in developing countries. While the
literature has discussed the role of input heterogeneity, we are not aware of frameworks
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FIGURE 4.—Firm size distribution for different dispersion in x (x is log-normally distributed LN (002),
i.e., logx is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 0.2, truncated at the bounds indicated in the legend,
with the measure of the truncated distribution normalized to 1).
that move beyond either homogeneity or efficiency units. To illustrate how our framework
might contribute, consider Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) who relied on farmer het-
erogeneity y and input l which represents land in their setting, as well as some generic
capital k that can be rented at unit cost i.23 Consider an extension to their production
function of form: f˜ (x y lk) = a(η(xk)ρ + (1 − η)(yl)ρ) γρ with parameters aηργ.
Farmer quality augments land holdings, but they considered only homogeneous inputs
(x = 1) despite a discussion section on heterogeneity. In the generalized form, x now
simply augments capital so that better inputs use capital more efficiently, even though
many other specifications would fit within our larger theory. Optimal profit given types
and land holdings is f (x y l)= maxk f˜ (x y lk)−Rk, which, in line with discussion in
the preceding paragraph, allows us to use the results from the main body that did not ex-
plicitly incorporate generic capital; in the Appendix, we show that this parameterization
generates positive sorting. Taking the rental rate of generic capital and the remaining pa-
rameters from Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014), we see that a mean-preserving spread
in input heterogeneity reduces heterogeneity in the distribution of land holdings across
farms, as better firms buy less but better land. There are indications that land quality in
developing countries might be more dispersed, which would then limit the right tail of
large firms in such countries.24 Such dispersion would be an efficient outcome given the
supply of good land, rather than a distortion.
Figure 4 uses the parameters for the developing countries and shows how firms of dif-
ferent types react to more dispersion: large ones shrink and small ones grow, in levels on
the left and in percentage terms on the right (details are described in the Appendix). Sim-
23Note that k represents a generic input such as fertilizers or tractors, while r is a specific limit on the
farmer such as his time endowment. Note also that agriculture might be a particularly suitable application of
our theory once generic capital is included. Both in the United States and in developing countries, a farm
is generally run by the farmer and his family and their time endowment is the relevant resource constraint
(contrary to intuition, seasonal help is only a minor part of overall farm labor, while generic capital in form
of tractors is the main source of additional help). Also, the restriction that all land within the farm is of equal
quality might not be that restrictive if farmers choose where to locate and local land has somewhat uniform
quality.
24Variation in land quality as measured by satellite images is positively correlated with ethnolinguis-
tic variation (Michalopoulos (2012)), while ethnolinguistic variation is typically negatively related to GDP
(Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012)).
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ilar compressions that limit the right tail might occur in the context of industrial firms and
their labor inputs, since dispersion of labor inputs is negatively correlated with the overall
level of education (Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2001)). We do not expect input heterogene-
ity to fully rationalize the differences between countries. Rather, we aim to provide a tool
that allows a formal discussion of these issues and their importance. A full exploration
would require a re-estimation of the generalized framework and an endogenous determi-
nation of the rental rates of capital within the larger economy beyond the single sector
that is at the heart of our theory.
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY has long been concerned with how individuals choose to lo-
cate across space, for example, within different locations of a mono-centric city, though
many models tend to abstract from spatial sorting.25 We therefore consider a model of
spatial sorting within the city. Let there be a continuum of locations y relative to the
center, each with space for construction hf (y). Agents with budget x have quasi-linear
preferences u(c s)= c + v(s) over consumption c and housing space s. The budget con-
straint is c+ps(y)s = xg(y), where x is the worker skill and g(y) is an increasing function
representing the time at work rather than in commute. Then we can write the individ-
ual citizen x’s optimization problem as xg(y) + v(h) − ps(y)s. Net of the transfers, the
aggregate surplus for all l citizens is given by F(x y l r)= xg(y)l+ v( r
l
)l. It is easily ver-
ified that sorting condition (11) is satisfied if v(·) is concave, so that individuals with high
incomes locate centrally and those with low incomes in the periphery.26
RELATION TO THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM LITERATURE. While the assortative match-
ing literature has made rather specific assumptions for multi-worker firms that we attempt
to generalize, the combinatorial matching and general equilibrium literature has instead
stayed general but has focused mainly on existence theorems rather than on character-
izing sorting or wage patterns. The classic example in the combinatorial matching liter-
ature by Kelso and Crawford (1982) proposes a many-to-one matching framework in a
finite economy and allows for arbitrary production externalities, both between the firm
and its workers and across the workers within the firm. In such a general setting, it is
well known that the stable equilibrium or the core may not exist, and Kelso and Craw-
ford (1982) derived a sufficient condition for existence in a finite agent model, that of
gross substitutes: adding another worker decreases the marginal value of each existing
worker. This condition is satisfied in our setting where externalities are mainly between
the firm and the workers while across-worker externalities are due to scarcity of inter-
nal resources only, and scarcity becomes more binding when there are fewer workers.
Gul and Stacchetti (1999) analyzed the gross substitutes condition in the context of Wal-
rasian equilibrium and showed existence and the relation between the Walrasian price
and the payment in the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism. In the context of auction de-
sign, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) analyzed package bidding as a model of many-to-one
matching. Our model differs from settings such as the Roy (1951) model and its recent
25Most work in new economic geography considers the location choice of homogeneous agents through
indifference conditions. Related to our setup is, in particular, Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002), who modeled
the location of identical citizens and incorporated productive as well as residential land use. Though agents
are identical, they earn different wages in different locations. The paper proves existence of a competitive
equilibrium in this generalized location model which endogenously can generate multiple business centers.
For a model with spatial sorting between cities, see Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny (2014).
26A similar functional form was used in Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) to consider differences between
cities rather than within the city, where, in their model, g(y) is replaced by a more agnostic time-varying
productivity term that differs across cities. Clearly, the sorting of more talented workers to more productive
cities prevails.
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variants in, for example, Heckman and Honore (1990), where each firm (or sector) can
absorb unbounded numbers of agents. In our setup, the marginal product decreases as
the firm grows larger. Models that combine the Roy setup with decreasing returns due
to price effects, such as Costinot (2009), do share commonalities to our model that are
discussed under multiplicative separability above.
MULTIPLE SKILL INPUTS. The prediction of the model that each firm hires exactly one
skill type is obviously counterfactual. Firms do hire workers of different ability. And while
there is mounting evidence that most of the increased inequality in worker earnings is due
to the increase between firms, not within firms,27 the within-firm inequality continues to
be substantial and important. The reason why in our model only one skill type is hired is
because we assumed, despite the multiple levels of complementarities between different
inputs, that there are no complementarities between different x’s. Not only does this en-
sure that the gross substitutes condition for existence discussed in the previous paragraph
is satisfied; this assumption has allowed us to characterize the sorting and size patterns
despite the fact that the general many-to-many matching model is notoriously hard to
analyze (Kelso and Crawford (1982)).
To address the issue of the multiple skill inputs and in order to draw closer to the
empirically observed heterogeneity, we have generalized the model to a setting in which
there are n distinct categories of skilled workers, each with a distribution of skills xi i =
1     n. We think of these categories as education. Output produced then needs inputs
from the different education categories, and the firm chooses the skill level xi for each of
these categories i.
Consider therefore a technology with firm type y as before and n skilled inputs, xi
for i = 1     n. We assume that these skill types are from disjoint sets and that there is
no substitution between these skills. Let the measure of these skills be Hwi. Then the
technology can be written as
f (x1x2     xn θ1 θ2     θn y)= f (xθ y) (17)
where x = x1     xn θi = liri , and θ = θ1     θn. Now an allocation comprises matchings:
y = μi(xi) for all i. In the case of PAM, the market clearing (or feasibility) condition is
satisfied for each category i:
∫ y
μi(xi)
θi(s)h
f (s)ds =
∫ x
x
hwi(s)ds (18)
Unfortunately, this is a complex problem for which we are not able to derive general
conditions for assortative equilibrium as in the n = 1 case.28 The problem is challenging
even with two skill inputs because of the complementarities between different skills and
the associated sizes. Moreover, we know from Kelso and Crawford (1982) that existence
27A sequence of recent empirical papers has documented in many countries that changes in wage inequality
are driven nearly exclusively by between-firm inequality rather than within-firm inequality; see Card, Heining,
and Kline (2013) for Germany; Song, Price, Guvenen, Bloom, and von Wachter (2015) and Barth, Bryson,
Davis, and Freeman (2014) for the United States; Benguria (2015) for Brazil; and Vlachos, Lindqvist, and
Hakanson (2015) for Sweden.
28Even with n= 2, the Hessian from which we derive the sorting condition is now a 4 × 4 matrix that needs
to be negative definite. After substituting for the differentiated first-order conditions, the determinant of the
Hessian becomes an expression with many different interactions that are complicated to handle. The derivation
is reported in the Supplemental Material (Eeckhout and Kircher (2017)).
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is not guaranteed, except under a condition of gross substitutes. Finally, we can also not
simply rewrite the conditions for sorting in terms of increasing differences (as in the one-
to-one matching model) because now it is not simply a matter of rearranging types; there
are also quantities. However, here we show that under some assumptions, we can make
progress in solving this allocation problem.
First, we assume that each category i produces output exactly as in our baseline model,
that is, we write output as an aggregation g of the output of each category i:
f (xθ y)= g(f 1(x1 yθ1)     f n(xn yθn)) (19)
We require output to be concave in θi, that is, giif iθ + gif iθθ < 0, where gi and gii de-
note the partial first and second derivative with respect to the i′th argument. Clearly, this
condition is met if g is concave in each argument. We also require gi > 0. Again define
Fi(x y l r)= rf i(x y l/r) as under n= 1. This functional form in equation (19) will al-
low us to express the conditions for sorting in terms of each individual function f i and
associated Fi as in the case of n = 1, in combination with properties on g. Clearly, ad-
ditive separability where g(f 1     f n)=∑i f i is a special case in which the results from
Propositions 1 and 2 immediately extend for each skill input: there is PAM between y and
xi provided Fixy ≥
Fi
yl
Fixr
Fi
lr
(NAM under the opposite sign) and the differential equations
(14) and (15) fully characterize the equilibrium allocation μi(xi) for each i. Separabil-
ity implies that the allocation problem of each skill input xi is solved in isolation and it
can easily be verified that the conditions for negative definiteness of the Hessian of the
full problem coincide with the negative definiteness of each allocation problem of Fi in
isolation. Only now different worker types associated with the same firm y are bundled
together for observational purposes. The subsequent analysis aims to extend this to more
meaningful aggregators.
Second, assume that each category i makes its own hiring decisions, aiming to maximize
the overall profitability of the firm. We will refer to this as “independent hiring.” That is,
we assume each unit i= 1     n solves the problem
max
xiθi
g
(
f(xθ y)
)−∑
i
θiwi(xi) (20)
This is a simpler problem than the full problem of a single firm that maximizes over all
x1     xn and θ1     θn simultaneously:
max
xθ
g
(
f(xθ y)
)−∑
i
θiwi(xi) (21)
Problem (20) might be reasonable in some larger organizations where coordination be-
tween units is difficult and each unit optimizes its allocation independently. More im-
portantly, this also has the advantage to yield a simpler pass at the difficult overall prob-
lem (21). A solution to the general problem (21) is also a solution to the problem (20).
One way to see this is to notice that the 2n first-order conditions of both sets of problems
are identical. The main differences are the second-order conditions, which are more de-
manding in the general problem than in the simplified one. Nevertheless, if we can prove
conditions that apply to all equilibria of the simplified setting (e.g., conditions for posi-
tive assortative matching that apply PAM for all such equilibria), we have also shown that
these apply in the general problem.
ASSORTATIVE MATCHING WITH LARGE FIRMS 109
With these two restrictions, we now derive a set of sufficient conditions on the technol-
ogy such that there is assortative matching. The reason why we need additional restric-
tions is that along the equilibrium allocation f i(νi(y) yθi(νi(y))) may not be increasing
in y , where θi(x) is the size of the workforce of type x and νi(y) is the worker type i
hired by firm y . Because the function g is monotonic in each argument, then a decreas-
ing f i may make the solution not positively assortative in another dimension j, precisely
because it is increasing in its arguments and supermodular. To that end, we calculate the
total derivative of f i with respect to y along its equilibrium allocation, which we denote
by the total derivative dFj/dy . We obtain the following result:
PROPOSITION 3: Consider the model with multiple skill inputs f (xθ y)= g(f 1(xi yθ1)
    f n(xn yθn)) and independent hiring; a necessary condition for PAM requires along the
equilibrium path for all i ∈ 1     n:
(gi)
2
[
FixiyF
i
liri
− FiyliF ixiri
]+ gigii
[
−F
i
r2i
+ F
i
ri
ri
][
FixiyF
i
li
− FiyliF ixi
]
(22)
+ gi
[
gii
Fiy
ri
+
∑
j 	=i
gij
dFj
dy
][
FiliriF
i
xi
− FixiriF ili
]≥ 0
If this holds for all (x l r y) in a candidate equilibrium satisfying the first-order conditions
to (20) with given dF
j
dy
, then this allocation is an equilibrium with PAM. If this holds for all
(x l r y) and all possible dF
j
dy
, then any equilibrium has to be PAM.
PROOF: In Appendix. Q.E.D.
The next proposition establishes that if the production function is convex and super-
modular, our condition for sorting together with the condition that more productive firms
are larger under any type densities, coupled with a new condition on the interplay with
size, ensure even in the multi-unit setting an equilibrium that is PAM and that more pro-
ductive firms are larger:
PROPOSITION 4: Consider the model with multiple skill inputs f (xθ y)= g(f 1(xi yθ1)
    f n(xn yθn)) and independent hiring, and assume that higher type firms y produce more
output. A sufficient condition for an equilibrium under PAM in which more productive firms
are larger and produce more (i.e., dFj/dy ≥ 0) is: gij ≥ 0 for all (i j) ∈ {12     n}2 with
i 	= j, and for all i and all (x l r y) it holds that
FixiyF
i
liri
− FiyliF ixiri ≥ 0 (23)
Fiyli ≥ 0 Fixiri ≤ 0 (24)
gii
([
FiliriF
i
xi
− FixiriF il
]
Fiy −
[
FixiyF
i
l − FiyliF ixi
]
Fil
li
ri
)
≥ 0 (25)
PROOF: In Appendix. Q.E.D.
If g is concave in each argument (i.e., gii < 0), then the last condition highlights natu-
rally that a large Fixiy is a force towards positive sorting while Fyli large is a force against
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it. This is in spirit similar but in functional form different from our main condition (23)
that carries over from the model with n= 1.
Finally, we provide a short illustration that we obtain very simple conditions for sorting
for a specific technology. Consider the setting where output is given by f =Πif i(xi y li).
In this case, the aggregator g is multiplicative in f i, and we can prove that the condition
for PAM in the benchmark model with n = 1 extends to each of the technologies Fi for
each category i.
COROLLARY 2: Let Fi =Ai(xi y)Bi(li ri) where Bi = lφii r1−φii (φi ∈ (01)), and let gii ≤
0. A sufficient condition for positive assortative matching in any equilibrium with independent
hiring is that, for all i,
FixiyF
i
liri
− FiyliF ixiri > 0 (26)
Therefore, any equilibrium where a single firm jointly makes all hiring decisions also displays
positive assortative matching.
PROOF: In Appendix. Q.E.D.
This condition to be satisfied for each skill group i is the same as the condition with
a single skill input (11). Observe that this condition does not require that output of any
given skill category j is increasing along the equilibrium allocation. Any effect a decreas-
ing output of input j could have on the optimal choice of skill i is neutralized by the
linearity of g and the Cobb–Douglas functional form of B(l r). Note also that the condi-
tion in the corollary is sufficient, not necessary. For example, gii may be positive as long
as φ is not too large.
This can be applied to the technology that we used to derive the example in Section 3 in
the benchmark case, but now let n= 2. Let g be multiplicative so that g(f 1 f 2)= f 1 · f 2
with associated aggregates Fi =A(xi y)B(li ri) where A is CES and B is Cobb–Douglas.
Then firm y ’s output g(f 1(x1 yθ1) f 2(x2 yθ2)) can be written as
g = (ω1x(σ1−1)/σ11 + (1 −ω1)y(σ1−1)/σ11 )σ1/(σ1−1)θφ11
(27)
× (ω2x(σ2−1)/σ22 + (1 −ω2)y(σ2−1)/σ22 )σ2/(σ2−1)θφ22 
For this technology, there will be PAM for all φi ∈ (01) provided that σi < 1 for all i,
where the latter condition follows from equation (26).
EXTENSIONS that allow for monopolistic competition at the output level within a Dixit–
Stiglitz setup are presented in the Appendix, where an extended condition for sorting
is derived. There we link our model to the optimal transportation literature and also
introduce endogenous type distributions.
5. SORTING WITH LARGE FIRMS AND SEARCH FRICTIONS
Questions about sorting between workers and firms have attracted interest not only
for competitive markets, but increasingly also for markets with matching frictions. Incor-
porating matching frictions allows us to study not only matching and wage patterns but
also the determinants of unemployment across heterogeneously skilled agents (see, e.g.,
Shimer and Smith (2000) and Atakan (2006) in the presence of random search and Shi
(2001), Shimer (2005), and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) under directed search). At the
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same time, multi-worker matching has recently attracted attention in that literature to
analyze how queue lengths vary across firms of different sizes (e.g., Smith (1999) for ran-
dom and Menzio and Moen (2010), Garibaldi and Moen (2010), Hawkins (2011), Kaas
and Kircher (2015), and Schaal (2015) for directed search), yet little is known about how
unemployment varies in the presence of sorting and variation in firm size jointly.29 The
contribution of the extension of the model developed here is to enable the joint analysis
of firm size, search frictions, and sorting.
We now show that the techniques developed in this paper are suitable to analyze search
frictions with large firms and sorting; notably, the sorting condition for PAM remains
unchanged at FxyFlr ≥ FxlFyr and is thus independent of the search frictions. Obviously,
the matching technology does affect the equilibrium allocation and the unemployment
rate, and we derive predictions about the unemployment rate of various worker types
and the vacancy rate across firms. To illustrate that our model is amenable to this, we
embed a costly recruiting and search process in the previous setup in order to capture the
hiring behavior of large firms. We first formally lay out the search model, then relate it to
the competitive economy we studied thus far, and finally we use this connection to prove
theorems about the search economy.
THE DIRECTED SEARCH ECONOMY WITH TWO-SIDED HETEROGENEITY AND LARGE
FIRMS. This setup builds on the directed search literature cited above, combining insights
from one-to-one sorting and large firms into one framework. As in the previous literature,
we assume for simplicity’s sake that workers and firms are risk-neutral. Consider a situ-
ation where the workers are unemployed and can only be hired by firms via a frictional
hiring process. Following Shi (2001), firms post for each vacancy the type of worker they
want to hire and the wage. That is, if firm y dedicates a vacancy to worker type x, it speci-
fies wage ωy(x). But now, a firm of type y decides also how many vacancies vy(x) to post
per unit of resources devoted to workers of type x that it wants to hire. We assume that
all vy(x) vacancies have the same wage ωy(x), but it is easy to show that this assumption
is without loss of generality. Posting vy(x) vacancies has a linear cost cvy(x). Observing
all vacancy postings, workers decide where to search for a job amongst those dedicated to
their type. Let qy(x) denote the “queue” of workers searching for a particular wage of-
fer, defined as the number of workers per vacancy. Frictions in the hiring process make it
impossible to fill a position for sure. Rather, the probability of filling a vacancy is a func-
tion of the number of workers queueing for this vacancy, denoted by m(qy(x)), which
is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave. Since there are qy(x) workers
queueing per vacancy, the job-finding rate is m(qy(x))/qy(x); it is assumed to be strictly
decreasing in the number of workers qy(x) queueing per vacancy.
Workers expect to obtain an expected equilibrium payoff of w(x). Firms can attract
workers to their vacancies as long as these workers get in expectation their equilibrium
payoff, meaning that qy(x) adjusts depending on ωy(x) to satisfy ωy(x)m(qy(x))/qy(x)=
w(x). Often w(x) is called the “market utility,” as it represents the return that workers
could get by queueing elsewhere for a job. Note the difference between the wage ωy(x)
which is paid when a worker is actually hired, and the expected wage w(x) of a queueing
worker who does not yet know whether he will be hired or not. In equilibrium, the firm
takes the latter as given because this is the utility that workers can ensure themselves
by searching for a job at other firms, while the former is the firm’s choice variable with
29Lentz (2010) and Bagger and Lentz (2016) studied sorting when firm size is limited only by search frictions,
albeit with linear production and with no interaction of workers within the production process of the firm.
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which it can affect how many workers will queue for its jobs. Therefore, a firm maximizes,
instead of (3), the new problem
max
Ry θy ωy vy
∫ [
f
(
x yθy(x)
)− θy(x)ωy(x)− vy(x)c]dRy(x)
(28)
s.t. θy(x)= vy(x)m(qy(x)) and ωy(x)m(qy(x))/qy(x)=w(x)
and Ry(x) integrates to unity. The first line simply takes into account that the firm must
pay the vacancy-creation cost. The second line states that the number of hires equals the
number of vacancies times the job-filling rate, and links the job-filling rate to the wage
offer as explained earlier.
The amount of workers with types below x queueing at firms of type y is now L˜y(x)=∫ x
x
θy(x˜)dRy(x˜). Clearly, feasibility requires that no more workers can be queueing than
there are in the economy; that is, for all x′ and x, it has to hold that∫
y
[L˜y(x)− L˜y(x′)]dHf ≤Hw(x)−Hw(x′) (29)
Finally, workers’ wage expectations w(x) must be consistent with the expected payments
that firms are willing to make in equilibrium. In particular, if wage expectations w(x′′)
for almost all workers x′′ in some interval (x′x] are strictly positive, then there must
be enough vacancies that actually offer such wages: all these workers must actually be
queueing for jobs that offer such wages (as workers who do not queue cannot obtain
a strictly positive payoff). Therefore, equation (29) cannot be slack, which leads to the
following equilibrium definition for a directed search economy with large firms:
DEFINITION 2: An equilibrium in a directed search economy is a tuple of functions
(wθyωy vyRyLy) consisting of a nonnegative market utility w(x) as well as intensity
functions θy(x), vacancy function vy(x), actual pay ωy(x), and resource allocations Ry(x)
with associated feasible L˜y(x) such that
1. Optimality: For any y , the combination (θyωy vyRy) solves (28).
2. Correct Wage Expectations: Equation (29) holds with equality if the market utility
is strictly positive a.e. on (x′x].
RELATION TO A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY. We now show that a relabeling of vari-
ables allows us to represent this economy as if it were a competitive market economy.
This allows us to use the insights from the previous sections to provide insights even in
the case of search frictions. The main idea is the following: in the current setup, qy(x)
and vy(x) determine the number sy(x) = qy(x)vy(x) of workers who search for jobs
(per unit of resource). Alternatively, the firm could choose sy(x) and vy(x), and then
qy(x)= sy(x)/vy(x) follows. Moreover, instead of maximizing over sy(x) and vy(x) simul-
taneously, the firm can first determine sy(x) and then choose vy subsequently to maximize
the following problem:
g(x y s)= max
v
[
f
(
x y vm(s/v)
)− vc] (30)
where we replaced θ in (28) by the constraint θ= vm(q)= vm(s/v). Problem 30 is strictly
convex, and the unique optimum v∗(x y s) is given by the first-order condition m(q)[1 −
qm′(q)/m(q)]fl(x y sm(q)/q)= c, where q= s/v∗. This corresponds to the well-known
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Hosios condition for efficient search. Simple replacement then transforms (28) and (29)
and associated Definition 2 into the following equivalent ones:
max
Ry sy
∫ [
g
(
x y sy(x)
)− sy(x)w(x)]dRy(x) (31)
where Ry integrates to unity; Ly(x)= ∫ x
x
sy(x˜)dRy(x˜) and
∫
y
[Ly(x)−Ly(x′)]dHf ≤Hw(x)−Hw(x′); (32)
and (wsyRyLy) constitutes an equilibrium if (syRy) solves (31) and if Ly satisfies
(32), with equality if w(x′′) > 0 for almost all types in (xx′]. Observe that this is exactly
our definition of a competitive equilibrium, only now with fictitious production function
g that embeds both the production as well as the matching process. Note that this works
precisely because the firm has to pay any “searcher” that queues for a job the expected
wage, whether or not it ends up getting the job. Note G(xy s r) = rg(x y s/r) pro-
vides the aggregate production function, which has constant returns to scale in s and r by
construction. We sum up the connection between the directed search economy and the
competitive economy in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 5: The expected wages (market utility) and matching patterns in a competi-
tive search economy with type distributions Hf and Hw and production function F(x y l r)
coincide with those of a competitive economy with same type distributions but fictional pro-
duction function G(xy s r) = maxv[F(x y rvm( svr ) r) − rvc]. Moreover, for types that
match in equilibrium, vy(x) = v∗(x y s), qy(x) = sy(x)/v∗(x y s), and θy(x) and ωy(x)
are then determined as in the constraint in (28).
RESULTS FOR COMPETITIVE SEARCH WITH LARGE FIRMS. The beauty of the previous
result is that G is fully determined by the primitives, and we can apply the tools we laid out
in Section 2 (where now G replaces F). The firm can be viewed as if it hires “searchers”
who must be paid their expected wage. Applying the machinery from the previous section
allows us to assess whether sorting is assortative, and surprisingly our cross-partial condi-
tion on G reduces to the standard cross-partial condition on F , so no further requirements
need to be imposed for sorting:
PROPOSITION 6: In the framework with directed search frictions, a necessary condition to
have equilibria with positive assortative matching under any arbitrary distribution of types is
that inequality (11) holds for all (x y l r) ∈ R4++ that satisfy fl(x y l/r) > c. If equation
(11) holds with strict inequality on this domain, it is also sufficient to ensure that any equilib-
rium entails positive assortative matching. The opposite inequality provides a necessary and
sufficient condition for negative assortative matching.
PROOF: In Appendix. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, the reason for this result is that vacancies can be adjusted at linear costs
to absorb the distortions in the matching function, and ultimately the driving force for
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sorting remains on the production side.30 The main reason why we only need our sorting
condition for combinations of (x y l r) such that fl(x y l/r) > c is due to the fact that
a number of searchers s leads to optimal vacancies v∗, but only to the level where the cost
of posting can be covered.
The next question concerns the matching probabilities and the size of the firm. Let l(x)
denote again the equilibrium size of the firm in which worker type x is employed. While
the sign of sorting is not dependent on the matching function, the condition whether
higher-type firms are larger, does. This is suggested already by the definition of firm size:
l(x)= s(x)m(q(x))/q(x) (33)
where s(x) and q(x) are again the equilibrium values for the number of searchers and
the queue lengths, and m(q)/q is the matching probability of the worker. The matching
probability depends on the optimal number of vacancies. Rather than studying firm size
directly, it is convenient to start with the workers matching probabilities for which we
obtain an unambiguous result:
PROPOSITION 7: Assume higher worker types create more output (Fx > 0). In the compet-
itive search equilibrium with large firms, higher skilled workers have lower market tightness
(q(x) decreasing) and associated higher matching probability. For types with strictly positive
expected wages w(x) > 0, these relationships are strict.
PROOF: In Appendix. Q.E.D.
Since better workers obtain higher expected payoff w(x) as determined in Problem 1
(otherwise a firm could hire better workers at equal cost), they face proportionally lower
competition for each job and correspondingly higher job-finding probabilities. This out-
come arises because the opportunity costs of having high skilled workers unsuccessfully
queue for employment are higher, and therefore firms are more willing to create enough
vacancies to enable most of these applicants to actually get hired for the job. Note that
this result is independent of the sorting patterns.
The sorting patterns matter when one wants to study the link between firm produc-
tivity, the vacancy-filling probability, and the vacancy rate v/l, which are often used in
empirical work. Since we know how these are linked to worker characteristics, we can link
them to firm productivities under sorting. But since size is not necessarily increasing with
productivity, there is no direct link to firm size:
PROPOSITION 8: In a competitive search equilibrium, the vacancy rate (v/l) is increasing
and the vacancy-filling probability is decreasing in firm productivity (y) under PAM, and the
reverse under NAM. They are ambiguous in firm size.
PROOF: In Appendix. Q.E.D.
30We expect the matching function to matter more if the marginal cost of posting vacancies increases with
the number of vacancies that are posted. With convex creation costs, we expect results to feature the matching
function more prominently, and in extreme cases where some vacancies are costless but after a threshold costs
increase to infinity, we expect sorting conditions that resemble those of settings where each firm can post one
vacancy.
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Finally, conditions for firm size depend both on the production function and on the
matching function. Consider again the setting with Fx > 0. Sufficient conditions for in-
creasing size under PAM are that the number of searchers s is increasing in productivity,
that is, that H(x)Gyl ≥ Gxr . This resembles part (1) of Corollary 1 and ensures a larger
number of searchers, s(x) is increasing, which then is reinforced by the higher matching
rate that these have (Proposition 7), and leads more productive firms to be larger overall.
Under NAM, these two counteract, and size conditions depend in an intricate way on the
matching and production function.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Assortative matching is prevalent across firms of different sizes. We propose a tractable
theory of the labor market where firms choose both the quality of the work force and the
quantity. This allows us to study sorting and firm size simultaneously. Whether assorta-
tive matching is positive now depends on a tradeoff of complementarities between types,
between quantities, and across types and quantities. The equilibrium allocation is com-
pletely characterized by a system of differential equations that pins down the allocation,
the firm size distribution, and the wage distribution.
Our model provides a unified approach to a number of existing models in the macro,
labor, and industrial organization literatures. While sufficiently rich to incorporate the
most relevant features of heterogeneity, in particular worker skill, firm productivity, firm
size, and wage inequality, our model is remarkably simple to analyze and can readily be
used to plug into a larger model of the economy. As an example, we establish that equi-
librium unemployment can be incorporated, thus enabling the joint analysis of frictional
unemployment in the presence of both sorting of heterogeneous workers and firms, and
of assortative matching in large firms.
APPENDIX A: OMITTED PROOFS AND DERIVATIONS
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
PROOF: Proceed by contradiction. Assume a positive measure of resources is placed
by active firm y on a set of worker types X˜ such that (xθy(x)) does not solve (max-
problem-simple). Let (x∗ θ∗) be an optimizer of (6). Firm profits can be decomposed
into the sum of
∫
x∈X\X˜ [f (x yθy(x)) − w(x)θy(x)]dRy(x) and
∫
x∈X˜ [f (x yθy(x)) −
w(x)θy(x)]dRy(x), where the first term captures the profits with worker types in X \
X˜ and the second term captures the profits with worker types in X˜ . Placing all re-
sources that the firm places on types in X˜ instead on type x∗ and choosing an in-
tensity at x∗ of θ∗ leaves the first term unchanged but changes the second term to∫
x∈X˜ [f (x∗ yθ∗) − w(x∗)θ∗]dRy(x), which strictly improves profits since the integrant
has strictly increased. Q.E.D.
A.2. Convex Preferences, Existence, and Welfare Theorems
One can interpret our economy in terms of a classical exchange economy: “Con-
sumers” in the classical model are our firms y ∈ Y . They consume a bundles (Ly ny),
where Ly denotes the amounts of labor of various types employed by firm y and ny
is the amount of numeraire it consumes. To make this an endowment economy, as-
sume that each firm is initially endowed with some of the workers and a sufficiently
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high level of the numeraire. The exact endowment of workers to firms does not mat-
ter because of the presence of the numeraire, so endowing each firm with the average
distribution of workers would suffice. Firm preferences are represented by utility func-
tion u(Ly ny |y) = ny + maxRy
∫
f (x yθy(x))dRy(x) such that θy(x) = dLy/dRy and∫
dRy < 1 where the first term captures the numeraire and the second optimal produc-
tion. If these preferences are convex, we can apply Ostroy (1984) or Khan and Yannelis
(1991) for existence and the former for core equivalence.
LEMMA 2: Firm preferences are convex.
PROOF: Consider three bundles (Ly ny), (L′y n′y), and (L′′y n′′y) such that u(Ly ny |
y) ≥ u(L′′y n′′y |y) and u(L′y n′y |y) ≥ u(L′′y n′′y |y). We then establish that u(αLy + (1 −
α)L′yαny +(1−α)n′y |y)≥ u(L′′y n′′y |y) for any α ∈ (01) since the firm can simply assign
a fraction α of its internal resources to workers with distribution Ly and the remainder to
the other workers, that is,
u
(
αLy + (1 − α)L′yαny + (1 − α)n′y |y) (34)
= αny + (1 − α)n′y + max
Ry s.t.
θy (x)=d(αLy+(1−α)L′y )/dRy∫
dRy<1
∫
f
(
x yθy(x)
)
dRy(x) (35)
≥ αny + (1 − α)n′y + max
Ry s.t.
θy (x)=αdLy /dRy∫
dRy<α
∫
f
(
x yθy(x)
)
dRy(x)
(36)
+ max
Ry s.t.
θy (x)=(1−α)dL′y/dRy∫
dRy<1−α
∫
f
(
x yθy(x)
)
dRy(x)
= αu(Ly ny |y)+ (1 − α)u(Ly ny |y) (37)
≥ u(L′′y n′′y |y) (38)
Q.E.D.
A.3. Sorting With Monotone Production and Smooth Distributions
LEMMA 3: If output F is strictly increasing in x and y and the type distributions have
nonzero continuous densities, then almost all active firm types y hire exactly one worker type
ν(y) and reach unique size l(y) in an assortative equilibrium.
PROOF: First, note that optimality requires that, for any given firm type y , almost all
its choices x ∈ suppLy and θy(x) solve problem (6) by Lemma 1. Next, observe that if x
is in the support of the labor demand Ly for any firm y , then all x′ > x have to be active.
If not, the wage for the higher type x′ is w(x′)= 0 and therefore weakly below w(x), but
x′ produces more output than x, which violates that x is optimal for firm y (formally: it
violates that x is in the support of Ly as all types in a small enough neighborhood around
x such that their type is below x′ fail to maximize (6)).
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Next, we show that an assortative equilibrium requires that almost all active firm types
hire only one worker type. We proceed by contradiction. Assume this were not true, that
is, for any type y in a set of active firm types Y ′ with strictly positive measure, it holds that
the support of its labor demand Ly contains more then one element. Assortativeness still
means that for almost all active firm types with y > y ′, it holds that x is in the support of
Ly and x′ is in the support of Ly′ only if x≥ x′. In particular, this applies also to almost all
types inY ′. So for a non-generic y ∈ Y ′ with x and x˜ > x in the support of its labor demand
Ly , the following has to hold: almost all firms with higher types have labor demands that
only place support on types above x˜, while almost all firm types below have labor demands
that only place support on types below x. Therefore, labor demand for all worker types in
interval (x x˜) has measure zero, but the supply of workers in this set has strictly positive
mass since the type distributions have nonzero densities. Market clearing then implies
that wages are almost everywhere zero for the types in (x x˜), meaning that these types
are inactive, which violates the previous paragraph.
Finally, given a unique choice x = v(y), there exists a unique choice of intensity (or
firm size). Since optimality requires solving (6), and this problem is strictly concave in
intensity, there is a uniquely optimal intensity choice. Q.E.D.
A.4. Derivations for Assortative Matching Omitted in the Text
Here we lay out the derivations that follow from the firm’s maximization problem (6)
in Lemma 1 to the sorting conditions that are built up towards Proposition 1.
Maximization (6) gives rise to first-order conditions (7) and (8). The second-order con-
dition for optimality requires the Hessian H to be negative definite, where
H =
(
fθθ fxθ −w′(x)
fxθ −w′(x) fxx − θw′′(x)
)
 (39)
This requires fθθ to be negative and the determinant |H| to be positive, or
fθθ
[
fxx − θw′′(x)
]− (fxθ −w′(x))2 ≥ 0 (40)
We can differentiate (7) and (8) with respect to the worker type to get
fxθ −w′(x) = −μ′(x)fyθ − θ′(x)fθθ (41)
fxx − θ(x)w′′(x) = −μ′(x)fxy − θ′(x)
[
fxθ −w′(x)
]
 (42)
In the following three lines, we successively substitute (42), (41), and then (8) into condi-
tion (40):
−μ′(x)fθθfxy −
[
θ′(x)fθθ + fxθ −w′(x)
][
fxθ −w′(x)
]
> 0 (43)
−μ′(x)fθθfxy +μ′(x)fyθ
[
fxθ −w′(x)
]
> 0 (44)
−μ′(x)[fθθfxy − fyθfxθ + fyθfx/θ] > 0 (45)
Since fθθ < 0, we can divide by −fθθ to get the condition reported in the main body. For
strictly positive assortative matching (μ′(x) > 0), it has to hold that the term in square
brackets in the last line is negative; for strictly negative assortative matching, the term
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in square brackets in the last line needs to be positive. Focusing on positive assortative
matching, and using the relationship in (8), we obtain the condition
fθθfxy − fyθfxθ + fyθfx/θ≤ 0 (46)
This condition can be summarized more conveniently in terms of the original function
F(x y r s), for which we know that F(x yθ1)= f (x yθ). The following relationships
will also prove useful. Homogeneity of degree 1 of F in l and r implies that −Flr = θFll.
Since F is constant returns, so is Fx.31 A standard implication of constant returns is then
Fx(x yθ1)= θFxl+Fxr . We can now rewrite (46) in terms of F(x yθ1) and rearrange
to obtain the following cross-margin-complementarity condition:
FllFxy − Fyl[Fxl − Fx/θ] ≤ 0 (47)
⇔ FllFxy + FylFxr/θ≤ 0
⇔ FxyFlr ≥ FylFxr (48)
Since Flr > 0, we can divide through to obtain inequality (11) in Proposition 1. This deriva-
tion provides a necessary condition for assortative matching for the specific conditions
with increasing output and nonzero type densities. It does not deal with distributions that
have mass points, nor does it provide sufficient conditions to rule out the existence of
other equilibria, for example those where the bottom half of workers matches positively
assortatively with the top half of firms and the top half of workers matches positively as-
sortatively with the bottom half of firms. The following proof of Proposition 1 accounts
for these cases.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 1
PROOF: Part I: Sufficiency. Focus on sufficiency for positive assortative matching. (The
same logic applies to negative assortative matching.) We need to prove that the strict
version of inequality (11) is sufficient to rule out any equilibria that are not positive as-
sortative. This part of the proof relies on the first welfare theorem. Since we have quasi-
linear utility, Pareto optimality requires output maximization. A feasible collection of
labor demands L= {Ly}y∈Y and resource allocations R= {Ry}y∈Y for all firm types yields
aggregate output
S(LR)=
∫
y∈Y
∫
x∈X
F
(
x yθy(x)1
)
dRy dHf  (49)
where θy = dLy/dRy . The first welfare theorem implies that the equilibrium (L∗R∗)
combination yields a weakly higher aggregate output than any other feasible (LR) com-
bination. In the following, we will show that if (11) holds strictly, then any allocation
(LR) that is not positive assortative can be improved upon by some (positive assorta-
tive) reallocation of workers that improves aggregate output, and therefore (LR) cannot
be an equilibrium.
Assume that Fxy >
FxrFyl
Flr
for all (x y l r) ∈ R4++ but an equilibrium allocation (LR)
is not positive assortative. The lack of positive sorting implies that two combinations
31It holds that F(x y l r)= rF(x y l/r1), so differentiation implies that Fx(x y l r)= rFx(x y l/r1).
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(x1 y1 θ1) and (x2 y2 θ2) exist with x1 > x2 but y1 < y2, that have strictly positive prob-
ability; that is, for any ε, there is a strictly positive measure of firm types in any ε-
neighborhood around yi with labor demands whose support includes worker types in an
ε-neighborhood around xi that obtain resources at intensity in an ε-neighborhood around
θi. These firms are active, as otherwise the support of their labor demand would be empty,
and for active firms optimality requires a strictly positive intensity, so we can focus on
combinations with θi > 0. The rest of the proof will proceed by assuming that a mass of
workers of type xi is employed by firms yi and receives resources with intensity θi, and we
will show that assigning some of the low type workers to the low type firms while assign-
ing some of the high type worker to the high type firms strictly increases output, yielding
a contradiction to the first welfare theorem. If this is the case, then the same argument
holds if the mass of workers is not at (xi yi θi) but in its neighborhood, since for a small
enough neighborhood the output is arbitrarily close to the output that arises if all mass
were concentrated only on the exact point, by continuity of F . We proceed in two steps.
Step 1 has the key insight.
1. Establish the marginal benefit from assigning additional workers to some resource type:
Consider some (x yθ) such that a total measure r of resources is deployed in this
match (where r is the product of the number of firms and their internal resources de-
ployed to x workers at intensity θ). To achieve this intensity, they are obviously paired
with the appropriate number of workers (of measure θr). As a preliminary step to the
variational argument that follows, we are interested in the marginal benefit of pairing an
additional measure rˆ of resources of type yˆ firms with workers of type x. The optimal
output is generated by withdrawing some optimal measure θˆrˆ of the workers that were
supposed to be working with resources of type y and reassigning them to work with re-
sources of type yˆ . The joint output at (x y) and (x yˆ) in (49) is given by
rf (x yθ− θˆrˆ/r)+ rˆf (x yˆ θˆ) (50)
Optimality of θˆ requires, according to the first-order condition, that fθ(x yθ− θˆrˆ/r)=
fθ(x yˆ θˆ), which shows that the optimal θˆ is itself a function of rˆ. Denote β(yˆ;x yθ)
the marginal increase of (50) from increasing rˆ, evaluated at rˆ = 0, is given by
β(yˆ;x yθ) = f (x yˆ θˆ)− θˆfθ(x yθ) (51)
where θˆ is determined by fθ(x yˆ θˆ)= fθ(x yθ) (52)
The constraint (52) reiterates the optimality of θˆ. Sometimes we will write θˆ(yˆ;x yθ) to
highlight that θˆ is a function of yˆ yx, and θ.
2. Not-PAM has strictly positive marginal benefits from matching the high types:
We started under the assumption that matching is not assortative, so that x1 is matched
to y1 at intensity θ1 and x2 to y2 at intensity θ2, but x1 > x2 while y1 < y2. For this to
be efficient, it must be more efficient to pair the last unit of resources of type yˆ = y1 to
workers with combination (x1 y1 θ1) than with workers that are otherwise matched at
(x2 y2 θ2):
β(y1;x2 y2 θ2)≤ β(y1;x1 y1 θ1) (53)
where β(·; · · ·) was defined in (51). Similarly, the marginal gains from pairing the last
unit of resources of type yˆ = y2 to workers otherwise matched at (x2 y2 θ2) than to work-
ers matched at (x1 y1 θ1):
β(y2;x2 y2 θ2)≥ β(y2;x1 y1 θ1) (54)
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We will show that if (53) holds, then (54) cannot hold, which yields the desired contra-
diction. Start by assuming that (53) is true. Now consider any yˇ ≥ y1 for which
β(yˇ;x2 y2 θ2)= β(yˇ;x1 y1 θ1) (55)
Observe that such a yˇ exists, by continuity of β(y ′ · · ·) in y ′. Assuming (53), if (54) also
holds, then there must be such a yˇ by the intermediate value theorem (if there is none,
then we already know that (54) cannot hold).
We will show that at this yˇ the marginal increase
β1(yˇ;x2 y2 θ2) < β1(yˇ;x1 y1 θ1) (56)
Given (53), this immediately implies that β(yˆ;x2 y2 θ2) < β(yˆ;x1 y1 θ1) for all yˆ > y1
(because around any point of equality, the right-hand side grows strictly faster than the
left-hand side in yˆ). Therefore, the strict inequality applies in particular also for yˆ = y2
and contradicts (54), which completes this part of the proof.
To show equation (56), observe first that the marginal increase of β with respect to yˆ in
(51) is given by
β1(yˆ;x yθ)= fy(x yˆ θˆ) (57)
where θˆ is again determined as in (52). So (56) is equivalent to
fy(x2 yˇ θˆ2) < fy(x1 yˇ θˆ1) (58)
where θˆ1 = θˆ(yˇ;x1 y1 θ1) and θˆ2 = θˆ(yˇ;x2 y2 θ2) as in (52). To show this, define ξ(x) for
all x in resemblance of (51) by the following equality:
f
(
x yˇ ξ(x)
)− ξ(x)fθ(x yˇ ξ(x))= β(yˇ;x2 y2 θ2) (59)
Substituting (52) into (51) reveals immediately that ξ(x2) = θˆ2. By (55), we can replace
the right-hand side in (59) by β(yˇ;x1 y1 θ1), and then the same argument establishes
that ξ(x1) = θˆ1. Implicit differentiation yields ξ′(x) = fxξ(x)fθθ −
fxθ
fθθ
, where we suppressed
the argument (x yˇ ξ(x)). Since we want to show (56) or its equivalent (58), and x1 > x2
by assumption, we have to show that fy(x yˇ ξ(x)) is strictly increasing in x. It is strictly
increasing in x if fxy + fyθξ′(x) > 0, where we again suppressed the argument (x yˇ ξ(x)),
which is then equivalent to
fθθfxy − fyθfxθ + fyθfx/ξ(x) < 0
This formula coincides with the strict inequality (46) and therefore the strict inequality
(48), that is, the strict version of inequality (11) which we assumed to hold. This condition
establishes that output can be strictly improved by pairing types positively assortatively,
which proofs sufficiency.
Part II: Necessity. We need to show that (11) is necessary to have PAM under any dis-
tribution of types. That is, if it is not true that (11) holds for all (x y l r), then there
will be a type distribution for which PAM will not be an equilibrium. Assume that (11)
fails at some (x′ y ′ l′′ r ′′). By continuity, it also fails at some (x′ y ′ l′ r ′) with l′ > 0 and
r ′ > 0 sufficiently close to (x′ y ′ l′′ r ′′). Then it also fails at (x′ y ′ θ′1) for θ′ = l′/r ′.
By continuity, this means that FxyFlr < FylFxr for all (x yθ1) ∈N , where N is a small
enough open neighborhood of (x′ y ′ θ′1). If we can restrict the equilibrium allocation
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to lie in N , then by the analogy of the preceding section for negative assortative match-
ing, we know that matching can only be negative assortative, and therefore (11) cannot
fail if we want to obtain positive assortative matching. Since we want to ensure posi-
tive assortative matching for all type distributions, we can choose the support of x and
y within this neighborhood. But since θ is endogenous, this requires slightly more work.
Assume that X = [x′x′ + ε] and Y = [y ′ y ′ + ε], and uniform type distributions with
mass Hεw(x
′ + ε)= θ′ and Hεf (y ′ + ε)= 1. For small enough ε′, firms make nearly identi-
cal profits. Since they can only match with nearly identical types, identical profits require
them to have nearly identical factor ratios θ(x). These must be close to the average ratio
in the population. Therefore, for ε small enough, all matches lie in N , which rules out
that matching can be positive assortative for all type distributions if (11) fails. Q.E.D.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 2
PROOF: Consider the case of PAM; the case of NAM can be derived in a similar way.
Differentiating market clearing condition (5) readily establishes the equation for μ′(x)
in (14). The equation for w′(x) follows from (8) since Fx = fx. Finally, totally differenti-
ating (7) with respect to x and substituting for w′ and μ′, we obtain
fxθ + fyθH(x)/θ(x)+ fθθθ′(x)− fx/θ(x)= 0 (60)
where we again suppressed the arguments (xμ(x)θ(x)) of the production function and
its derivatives. This defines θ′(x). Using (2), we can replace fxθ(x yθ) with Fxl(x yθ1),
and similarly for the other derivatives. Moreover, in the Appendix (between (46) and
(47)), we review that Fx = θFxl + Fxr and Flr = −θFll when evaluated at (x yθ1). Sub-
stitution then yields the condition for θ′(x) in (14). Q.E.D.
A.7. The non-homogeneous Production Technology
Let output of the firm be F(x y l r), and the firm of type y chooses the worker type
and the labor intensity l. As before, let the capital intensity r be given, but we no longer
require constant returns to scale in the quantity dimensions. Then the problem of a firm
that chooses exactly one type x is
max
x˜l˜
F(x˜ y l˜ r)− l˜w(x˜)− rv(y) (61)
The first-order conditions for optimality are
Fx
(
xμ(x) l r
)− lw′(x) = 0 (62)
Fl
(
xμ(x) l r
)−w(x) = 0 (63)
where μ(x) and l are the equilibrium values. The second-order condition of this problem
requires the Hessian H to be negative definite:
H =
(
Fxx − lw′′ Fxl −w′
Fxl −w′ Fll
)
 (64)
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which requires that all the eigenvalues are negative, or equivalently, Fxx − lw′′ < 0 (which
follows from concavity in all the arguments (x y l r)), and∣∣∣∣Fxx − lw′′ Fxl −w′Fxl −w′ Fll
∣∣∣∣> 0 (65)
After differentiating the two FOCs along the equilibrium allocation to substitute for Fxx−
lw′′ = −Fxyμ′ and Fxl −w′ = −Fylμ′ and also using the first FOC to rewrite w′ = Fx/l, we
get ∣∣∣∣−Fxyμ′ −Fylμ′Fxl −w′ Fll
∣∣∣∣> 0 (66)
or −FxyFllμ′ + (Fxl − Fx/l)Fylμ′ > 0 and thus PAM requires (knowing that Fll < 0)
Fxy >
(Fx/l− Fxl)Fyl
|Fll|  (67)
Observe that this condition is similar to the one we obtained for the homogeneous case,
only that now the condition depends on the marginal product Fx and the concavity of
F in l, Fll.32 Finally, it is easy to show that the firm finds it strictly optimal to indeed
concentrate all its resources on one worker type if F has increasing returns to scale in l
and r. With decreasing returns to scale, this is not true, and one has to additionally impose
the restriction that firms can only hire one worker type to use our methodology.
A.8. Proof of Proposition 6
PROOF: Let v∗(x y s r) maximize F(x y rvm(s/vr) r) − rvc. Also, define V ∗(x y
s r) as the maximizer of F(x yV m(s/V ) r)−V c with respect to V . Given our assump-
tions on the production and matching function, it is easy to show that V ∗ is unique and
determined by the appropriate first-order condition, which in turn implies that it is dif-
ferentiable by the implicit function theorem. Clearly, V ∗(x y s r) = rv∗(x y s r) and
we can write G(xy s r) = F(x yV ∗(x y s r)m(s/V ∗(x y s r)) r) − V ∗(x y s r)c.
The sorting condition on G has to hold for all (x y s r). Note that any quantity of
labor l = V ∗(x y s r)m(s/V ∗(x y s r)) can be sustained by an appropriate choice of
(x y s r) as long as fl(x y l) > c, which obtains directly from the first-order condition
for v∗. So conditions on F are restricted to this domain.
For G, we obtain the first-order conditions
Gy = Fy
(
x yV ∗(x y s r)m
(
s/V ∗(x y s r)
)
 r
)
 (68)
Gr = Fr
(
x yV ∗(x y s r)m
(
s/V ∗(x y s r)
)
 r
)
 (69)
where we drop arguments from the equation whenever there is no possibility of confu-
sion. The arguments related to ∂V ∗/∂y and ∂V ∗/∂r do not appear because of the envelop
32The condition for sorting here depends on Fxl which is not the case in condition (11). Of course, there are
transformations of (11) that include different derivatives (e.g., Fxl), obviously with a less concise and intuitive
interpretation.
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condition. Cross-partial derivatives are
Gxy = Fxy + Fyl
∂
(
V ∗m
(
s/V ∗
))
∂V ∗
∂V ∗
∂x
 (70)
Gsr = Flr
[
∂
(
V ∗m
(
s/V ∗
))
∂s
+ ∂
(
V ∗m
(
s/V ∗
))
∂V ∗
∂V ∗
∂s
]
 (71)
Gys = Fyl
[
∂
(
V ∗m
(
s/V ∗
))
∂s
+ ∂
(
V ∗m
(
s/V ∗
))
∂V ∗
∂V ∗
∂s
]
 (72)
Gxr = Fxr + Frl
∂
(
V ∗m
(
s/V ∗
))
∂V ∗
∂V ∗
∂x
 (73)
Now the sorting condition GxyGsr ≥ GysGxr is equivalent to the condition on output
FxyFrl ≥ FylFxr . Q.E.D.
A.9. Proof of Proposition 7
PROOF: We can rewrite the firms’ original maximization problem (28) as
maxθ(x)Ry (x)
∫ [F(x yθ(x)1) − C(θ(x)x)]dRy(x) where Ry(x) integrates to unity,
with C(lx) = minvq[cv + vqw(x)] s.t. l = vm(q). To hire a given number l of workers
of type x, the firm has two choice variables: its queue length or its number of vacan-
cies. The firm chooses them optimally to minimize the costs of achieving l hires, and
C(lx) represents the minimum cost. Writing the elasticity of the matching probability
as η(q) := qm′(q)/m(q) and by denoting the queue length that solves the minimization
problem by q(x), we obtain
w(x)q(x)= η
(
q(x)
)
1 −η(q(x))c (74)
For commonly used matching functions for which the elasticity is constant, this immedi-
ately implies that q(x) is decreasing since w(x) is increasing, and strictly so if the workers
are actually hired (otherwise, firms could attract better workers at lower costs, violating
optimality). In general, the term η(q)/[q(1−η(q))] =m′(q)/[m(q)−qm′(q)] is decreas-
ing in q, since the numerator is strictly decreasing and the denominator is strictly increas-
ing in q. Implicit differentiation of (74) implies that q(x) is decreasing Q.E.D.
A.10. Proof of Proposition 8
PROOF: Consider PAM (likewise for NAM). The vacancy-filling probability m(q) is
decreasing in x, and under PAM also in y . The vacancy rate (v/l = 1/m(q)) is then in-
creasing. However, from Proposition 2, firm size ambiguous is in y . In particular, size is
increasing if H(x)Gyl ≥Gxr and decreasing if the inequality is reversed. Q.E.D.
A.11. Efficiency Units of Labor
A special case of our framework is the setting with efficiency units of labor, where
firm y hires types x1     xn in quantities l1     ln and produces output F˜(y
∑n
i=1 xili)
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that is strictly increasing and strictly concave in the second argument with appropriate
Inada conditions. We claim that the same level of output is replicated in our setting when
F(x y l r)= rF˜(yxl/r). This is trivially true when there is only one worker type, as all
resources are concentrated on this type. Now consider several worker types x1     xn at
quantities l1     ln. The firm allocates its unit amount of resources optimally between
them, that is, solves
max
r1rn∈[01]n
n∑
i=1
F(xi y liri) s.t.
n∑
i=1
ri = 1 (75)
⇔ max
r1rn∈[01]n
n∑
i=1
riF˜(yxili/ri) s.t.
n∑
i=1
ri = 1 (76)
Writing r1 = 1−∑i>1 ri and taking first-order conditions to the problem for all i= 2     n
yields
F˜
(
y
x1l1
r1
)
− x1l1
r1
F˜
(
y
x1l1
r1
)
− F˜ ′
(
y
xili
ri
)
+ xili
ri
F˜ ′
(
y
xili
ri
)
= 0 (77)
An obvious (and also unique) solution to this is to set r∗i such that factor intensities are
equalized, that is, x1l1
r∗1
= xili
r∗i
. That is, r∗i = xili∑n
j=1 xj lj
. Then the total output that the firm
achieves is
n∑
i=1
F
(
xi y lir
∗
i
)= n∑
i=1
r∗i F˜
(
yxili/r
∗
i
)
(78)
=
n∑
i=1
xili
n∑
j=1
xjlj
F˜
(
y
n∑
j=1
xjlj
)
(79)
= F˜
(
y
n∑
j=1
xjlj
)
 (80)
which was to be proven.
A.12. Generalized Efficiency Units of Labor
Consider firm y that hires different worker types x1x2     xn at quantities l1 l2     ln.
Generalized efficiency units are captured by a production function f˜ (x¯ yL) which takes
as input the average type x¯ = ∑ lixi/∑ li and the sum of labor cL = ∑ li. In con-
trast, in our setting, there is a production function f (x y l) if there is only one worker
type, but otherwise output is given by maxr1r2rn
∑
F(xi y li ri) with
∑
ri = 1 and
F(xi y li ri) := rif (xi y li/ri). Clearly, for our production function to satisfy the gener-
alized efficiency unit formulation, it must do so even if only one worker type x1 is present.
So f (x y l) = f˜ (x y l). This defines f completely, and therefore F is also completely
defined When f˜ is strictly convex in its first argument, our production function does not
capture its production under multiple types. In fact, our production function always pro-
duces more: f˜ (x¯ yL) ≤∑ni=1 li∑n
j=1 lj
f˜ (xi y
∑n
j=1 lj) ≤ maxr1r2rn
∑
rif˜ (xi y li/ri) with
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∑
ri = 1. The first inequality follows from convexity, and the second would be fulfilled
with equality if ri = li∑n
j=1 lj
, but in general will be strict because the maximum is higher. But
note that maxr1r2rn
∑
rif˜ (xi y li/ri) with
∑
ri = 1 is the output that a firm in our setup
would make (since F(xi y li ri)= rif˜ (xi y li/ri)). Under our production functions, the
welfare theorems apply, so output must be maximized. If our sorting condition applies,
the firm objective is maximized when firms do not hire multiple workers in our setting.
With generalized efficiency units, the same output can be produced if only one type is
hired, but strictly less if multiple types are hired by one firm, so also in that case, firms do
not want to mix multiple types and our sorting condition remains sufficient. The condition
also remains necessary since its violation leads to breakdown of PAM but not to break-
down of pure matching, which can still be replicated even under generalized efficiency
units.
A.13. Proof of Proposition 3
PROOF: To establish PAM between xi and y , we can fix all other variables and focus
on this dimension. Let fˆ i(xi y li) = g(f i(xi y li) f−i(x−i l−i y)). Then the associated
Fˆ i is, by (2), defined as Fˆ i(xi y li ri) = rifˆ i(xi y li/ri) or equivalently Fˆ i(x y l r) =
rig(f
i(xi y li/ri) f−i(x−i l−i y)) = rig(Fi(xi y li ri)/ri f−i(x−i l−i y)). Successively do-
ing this for all i leads to output function
F = (Πi=1nri)g
(
F 1(x1 y l1 r1)/r1    F
n(xn y ln rn)/rn
)
 (81)
For there to be PAM in xi y , we require
FxiyFliri ≥ FyliFxiri  (82)
where
Fxi = (Πj=1nj 	=irj)giFixi  (83)
Fli = giFili  (84)
Fxiy = giFixiy + Fixi
[
gii
Fiy
ri
+
∑
j 	=i
gij
dFj
dy
]
 (85)
Fliri = giFiliri + giiFil
[
−F
i
r2i
+ F
i
ri
ri
]
 (86)
Fyli = giFiyli + Fil
[
gii
Fiy
ri
+
∑
j 	=i
gij
dFj
dy
]
 (87)
Fxiri = giFixiri + giiFixi
[
−F
i
r2i
+ F
i
ri
ri
]
 (88)
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and gi denotes the partial derivative of g with respect to its i′th argument. Then we can
write the condition for PAM in xi y as
[
giF
i
xiy
+ Fixi
[
gii
Fiy
ri
+
∑
j 	=i
gij
dFj
dy
]][
giF
i
liri
+ giiFil
[
−F
i
r2i
+ F
i
ri
ri
]]
(89)
≥
[
giF
i
yli
+ Fil
[
hii
Fiy
ri
+
∑
j 	=i
gij
dFj
dy
]][
giF
i
xiri
+ giiFixi
[
−F
i
r2i
+ F
i
ri
ri
]]
(90)
or
(gi)
2
[
FixiyF
i
liri
− FiyliF ixiri
]+ gigii
[
−F
i
r2i
+ F
i
ri
ri
][
FixiyF
i
l − FiyliF ixi
]
(91)
+ gi
[
gii
Fiy
ri
+
∑
j 	=i
gij
dFj
dy
][
FiliriF
i
xi
− FixiriF il
]≥ 0 (92)
This condition has to hold along the equilibrium path; otherwise, the second-order condi-
tion for optimality is violated. If the condition holds everywhere, we have proven earlier
that this is sufficient for optimality for the given subunit. Q.E.D.
A.14. Proof of Proposition 4
PROOF: Consider a subunit i. If dFj/dy ≥ 0 for all j 	= i, then the conditions on g
together with (23) and (25) insure that (22) holds for all (x l r y). This is most easily
seen by noticing that CRTS implies that Fi = liFil + riFir so that Fil liri = Fi/ri − Firi , which
can be substituted into (25). Equation (22) then follows immediately. Since we can do this
for all subunits i, this implies PAM everywhere as long as each subunit believes that the
other subunits expand output with productivity.
So we simply must check that, under PAM, it is indeed optimal for each i to increase
output with productivity. Note that output changes according to
dFi/dy = Fixν′i + Fiy + Fil l′iν′ (93)
≥ Fixν′i + Fiy + Fil
HFiyl − Fixr
Filr
ν′ (94)
where the last step follows because size l′i(x) in equilibrium can be determined in similar
ways as θı´′(x) in condition (60). The only difference is that when “totally differentiating
(7),” additional terms arise that have to do with dFj/dy in the other subunits. Under
the belief that these are increasing, this leads to additional forces that also point towards
larger firms, leading to an even larger response than in the basic model. Clearly, (24)
ensures that dFi/dy ≥ 0 no matter what the ratio of types H. Q.E.D.
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TABLE II
PARAMETERS
Parameter U.S. Baseline (Rich) Less A (Poor) Source
TFP (A) 1.0 0.3987 Normalization
Price of agricultural good (pa) 0.3159 0.5209 Calibration
Rental price of capital (R) 0.13099 0.3958 Equilibrium
Average and per capita (L/N) 169.249 19.595 Data
κ 1.0 1.0 Normalization
ρ 1/4 1/4 Calibration
η 0.89 0.89 Calibration
Mean farmer skill (μy) −18316 −18316 Calibration
Std farmer skill (σy) 4.6553 4.6553 Calibration
A.15. Proof of Corollary 2
PROOF: Without loss, we drop the superscript i. B being Cobb–Douglas can then be
interpreted as CES with elasticity of substitution εB = 1. Then
BBlr
BlBr
= 1
εB
= 1 (95)
Therefore, FiliriF
i
xi
− FixiriF il = ABlrAxB − AxBrABl = AAx(BlrB − BrBl) = 0, and the
third term in the main condition (22) becomes zero. Then the main condition (22) be-
comes
(gi)
2[AxyABBlr −AxAyBlBr] − gigiiφAB
r2
BBl[AxyA−AxAy]> 0 (96)
The term AxyABBlr −AxAyBlBr > 0 is implied by (26). In the second term, the expression
in brackets AxyA−AxAy > 0 follows from (26) and (95). With gii < 0, the second term is
positive, a sufficient condition for the whole expression (96) to be positive. Q.E.D.
APPENDIX B: MISALLOCATION DEBATE
This section supplies additional material for the discussion on misallocation in Sec-
tion 4. Our illustration is based on Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014), who used the
following production function: f˜ (x y lk)= a(η(xk)ρ + (1 − η)(yl)ρ) γρ with x = 1 and
parameters ηργ and productivity a = Apaκ, where A is aggregate productivity, pa is
the output price, and κ is a scalar that can distinguish developing and developed coun-
tries. They determined the rental rate R of generic capital within a larger multi-sector
model. Instead, we take the rental rate as given for our illustration that only focuses on
the agricultural sector. We use their values for their case with different aggregate factors
but without distortions, as summarized in Table II.
The distribution of farmer skill is assumed to be a log-normal with the parameters spec-
ified above. Average land per capita plays a role as a scaling factor for the distributions
of x and y . Our only adjustment is to round the elasticity of substitution to ρ = 025
from their original value of 024, which allows us to use third-degree polynomials to cal-
culate the optimal capital. Figure 5 shows that this does not matter much for our ability
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FIGURE 5.—Replication of the firm size distribution in Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) with our com-
putational algorithm with negligible spread in x and ρ= 25.
to replicate their firm size distribution in developed and developing countries within our
matching setup with nearly identical workers (x≈ 1).
Defining F˜(x y l rk)= rf˜ (x y l/rk) and F(x y l r)= maxk F˜(x y l rk)−Rkr,
we can either use (11) directly to see whether sorting is PAM, or alternatively, we can use
the envelope condition developed in Extension II below in this Appendix and PAM arises
if
{FxyFlrFkk − FxyFlkFrk − FxkFykFlr} − {FxrFylFkk − FxrFykFlk − FxkFylFrk}> 0 (97)
⇔
000272284375A3p3ar
2(kx)05
(
ly
r
)025
k2lxy
(98)
×
(
089(kx)025 + 011
(
ly
r
)025)30
> 0
so that it holds for the chosen parameters in both the rich and the poor country as long
as x y l rk are positive. We find the equilibrium by first finding the optimal generic
capital level given x y l r and for computational ease we approximate it by a high-order
polynomial. Substituting this out to obtain F(x y l r), we can use the first two equations
in (14) as a differential equation system in μ(x) and θ(x). We use truncated distributions
on both sides, and know that the top agents are matched. The other end-point condition
is that the lowest types are matched if all agents can obtain positive payoffs; otherwise,
the cutoff type at the side that is not fully matched makes zero payoffs. We use a shooting
algorithm to hit the end-point conditions along the equilibrium path.
When we spread the type distribution for land, we use a truncated log-normal distribu-
tion with μx = 1 and σx = 02. That is, the mean of land quality is still 1. We increase the
spread by increasing the distance between the truncation points. The actual algorithm is
solved on a grid. Supplementary material (Eeckhout and Kircher (2017)) with construc-
tion and code are available.
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APPENDIX C: EXTENSIONS
C.1. Extension I. Monopolistic Competition
In the previous sections, we analyzed the case where the firm’s output is converted
one-for-one into agents’ utility. Therefore, there are no consequences of output on its
price, which is normalized to 1. An often used assumption in the industrial organization
and the trade literature concerns consumer preferences pioneered by Dixit and Stiglitz,
which are CES with elasticity of substitution ρ ∈ (01) among the goods produced by
different firms. For these preferences, it is well known that a firm that produces output f˜
achieves sales revenues χf˜ ρ, where χ is an equilibrium outcome that is viewed as constant
from the perspective of the individual firm33 The difficulty in this setup is that, despite
the fact that output is constant returns to scale in employment and firm resources, the
revenue of the firm has decreasing returns to scale. Therefore, we cannot directly apply
(11). But if there is assortative matching, the firm employs only one worker type, in which
case revenues are f (x y l) = χf˜ (x y l)ρ, and we can apply (46) directly. If f˜ (x y l) is
multiplicatively separable and linear in l so that we can write f˜ (x y l) = g(x y)l, then
our sorting condition reduces to the requirement of log-supermodularity of g, which is
a known condition in the trade literature. Our condition also implies insights into the
nonseparable and nonlinear case. Rearranging and using F˜(x y l r) = rf˜ (x y l/r), we
get the condition for positive assortative matching
[
ρF˜xy + (1 − ρ)(F˜)∂
2 ln F˜
∂x∂y
][
ρF˜lr − (1 − ρ)lF˜ ∂
2 ln F˜
∂l2
]
(99)
≥
[
ρF˜yl + (1 − ρ)F˜ ∂
2 ln F˜
∂y ∂l
][
ρF˜xr + (1 − ρ)
(
lF˜xl − lF˜ ∂
2 ln F˜
∂x∂r
)]
 (100)
Several points are noteworthy. First, the condition is independent of χ, and therefore can
be checked before this term is computed as an outcome of the market interaction. Fur-
thermore, for elastic preferences (δ→ 1), the condition reduces to our original condition
(11). Otherwise, log-supermodularity also appears in the condition.
C.2. Extension II. Optimal Transportation
Assume it costs −r · c(x y) to move r units of waste from production site x into des-
tination storage y , and if one attempts to move more units r into any given amount l
of storage, then there is some probability of damage d(r/l) that each unit that is stored
gets destroyed. This leads to function F(x y l r)= −rc(x y)−αrd(r/l), where α repre-
sents the lost revenue because of destruction. Unlike in the standard Monge–Kantorovich
transportation problem, storage sites do not have a fixed capacity (except if d(r/l) is zero
when r/ l is below unity and a very large number if it is above). Rather, more or less can
be stored in a given location, but at increasing costs.
33The underlying form for the utility function is U = x1−μ0 (
∫
c(y)ρ dy)μ/ρ where x0 is a numeraire good
and c(y) is the amount of consumption of the good of producer y Then one obtains χ = (μY)1−ρPρ where
Y is the aggregate incomepy denotes the price achieved by firm y through its equilibrium quantity, and
P = (∫ pρ/(1−ρ)y )ρ/(1−ρ) represents the aggregate price index
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C.3. Extension III. Endogenous Type Distributions, Technology Choice, Team-Work
One way to endogenize the type distribution is to assume that there is free entry of
firms (free entry of resources in the model), but entry with type y costs c(y). If output
increases in y , that is, F2 > 0, then it is crucial for a meaningful entry decision that c(y) is
strictly increasing. If c is strictly increasing and differentiable, and our sorting condition is
satisfied everywhere, it is not difficult to construct an equilibrium where profits equal the
entry cost c(y) for all active firms. In fact, this formulation is easier to construct: we know
that the highest types match, so that μ(x¯)= y¯ . The problem is usually how to determine at
which ratio they match, that is, to find θ(x¯). But here it is given simply by the requirement
that the profits of the highest firm equal the entry costs. Substituting the first-order condi-
tion (7) into the objective function yields profit f (x¯μ(x¯) θ(x¯))− θ(x¯)fθ(x¯μ(x¯) θ(x¯)),
which has to equal c(μ(x¯)). This can be then used together with the first-order conditions
and the differential equations in (14) to construct the type distribution after entry at all
lower types.
More complicated is the analysis when one considers a common pool of workers, some
of whom choose to be managers while others choose to remain workers. This is then a
teamwork problem, where one team becomes the y ′s and the other the x′s. While inter-
esting, we leave this analysis for further work.
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